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OWNING PERSONS:  
THE APPLICATION OF PROPERTY THEORY 
TO EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 
Jessica Berg* 
“Legal thought is, in essence, the process of categorization.”1
With over 400,000 embryos currently in storage and more 
created each day, debates about the legal status of embryos are 
likely to become more prevalent.  If embryos are persons, then 
the analogy is to children, and the legal framework is one of 
custody, best interests, and protection of embryo rights.  If 
embryos are property, then the analogy is to gametes, and the 
legal framework is one of control, contract, and protection of 
progenitors’ rights.  Most commentators and courts assume that 
an entity falls under either a property framework or a person 
framework (or perhaps something new), but not a combined 
property and person framework.  This Article takes a novel 
approach.  It argues that “person” and “property” are not 
mutually exclusive designations, and one might recognize both 
property interests in, and personhood interests of, certain 
entities.  Depending on the outcome of the personhood analysis, 
either property interests will control (if there are no personhood 
interests), the property interests will be balanced against the 
personhood interests, or the personhood interests will 
completely trump the property interests. 
 * Associate Professor of Law and Bioethics, Case Western Reserve 
University Schools of Law and Medicine.  B.A., 1990 and J.D., 1994, Cornell 
University.  I would like to thank Laura Chisolm, Jonathan Entin, Paul Heald, 
Sharona Hoffman, Insoo Hyun, Jacqueline Lipton, Max Mehlman, Andrew 
Morriss, Dale Nance, and John Robertson for providing valuable comments on 
earlier drafts; and Wednesday Forest, Loren Sonkin, and John Titley for their 
research assistance.  All errors and omissions are, of course, the author’s own. 
 1. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: 
The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 327 
(1980). 
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This Article is the first in a two-part series.  Its focus is on 
substantiating the argument that property law is the 
appropriate basis for legal analysis in this context.  It is 
appropriate in four senses: (1) it provides a conceptually better 
fit than the competing procreative liberty framework; (2) it is 
normatively compelling, based on the application of property 
theories; (3) it provides a descriptively accurate explanation for 
many of the courts’ actions in embryo disposition cases (despite 
some of those same courts’ unwillingness to use the term 
“property”); and (4) it allows courts to draw on an existing 
framework of property law to resolve disputes.  A companion 
article considers the application of personhood law to embryos 
and fetuses and explores the limitations an entity’s personhood 
interests place on the exercise of others’ property interests.   
The approach is sure to challenge commentators on all sides of 
the debate.  For those who argue that embryos and fetuses are 
persons, the theory of strong property interests will likely be 
unpalatable.  Similarly, the implications of the combined 
framework for limiting those property rights as the entity 
develops will likely be unacceptable to advocates of extensive 
procreative choice during pregnancy.  Nevertheless, this 
framework provides a more accurate understanding of the legal 
issues and, therefore, may facilitate the eventual resolution of 
the protracted battle regarding the legal status of embryos and 
fetuses. 
In 1983, a wealthy couple died intestate, leaving behind a 
million-dollar estate and two frozen embryos,2 and the court was 
 2. Although the term “embryo” is the most commonly used label, the 
appropriate scientific term for the conceptus (fertilized egg) at the earliest stage 
of development is “blastocyst.”  So-called “extra-corporeal embryos”—those that 
are outside the womb—are actually blastocysts.  A blastocyst is a multi-celled 
organism (a group of cells around a fluid filled cavity called the morula) that 
forms four days after fertilization.  Fertilization is the event that begins with 
the sperm entering the egg and concludes when the genetic material is 
combined to form the zygote, or the single-celled organism, immediately after 
the egg and sperm have joined.  The cells in question are undifferentiated.  In 
other words, they are able to form into any of the cells in the body, and each one 
of the cells can be separated from the unit and divide to form another 
blastocyst.  This process, called “twinning,” would result in two (or more) 
genetically identical individuals.  “Embryo” is the term given to the entity at 
approximately two weeks after fertilization, which coincides with the formation 
of the primitive streak (which will eventually develop into the neural system).  
Occasionally, the term “preembryo” is used to refer to the developing entity 
during the two-week stage prior to the formation of the primitive streak.  
Despite the scientific definitions, the common usage of the term “embryo” has 
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faced with the question of whether the embryos were property to be 
inherited or persons to be implanted.3  In 1986, Louisiana passed a 
statute stating that embryos are “persons” and must be implanted.4  
In 1989, a French geneticist testified in a Tennessee trial court that 
embryos are “tiny persons.”5  That same year, a federal district court 
in Virginia held that frozen embryos are property for which a 
bailment can be created.6  In 1992, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
heard the appeal of the “tiny persons” case and held that frozen 
embryos are neither persons nor property, “but occupy an interim 
category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.”7  In 1998, the highest court in New York 
rejected the “interim category” approach and stated that 
progenitors8 hold a “bundle of rights” in their frozen embryos.9  In 
1999, a Michigan court agreed, stating that frozen embryos are not 
“children” for whom custody and child support must be determined.10  
Frustrated with the lack of consistent resolution, the Supreme Court 
of Washington decided a 2002 embryo dispute case asserting that 
“whether a preembryo is a ‘child’ is not a logical or relevant 
inquiry.”11
With over 400,000 embryos currently in storage and more 
created each day, these debates about the legal status of embryos 
are likely to become more prevalent.12  If persons, the analogy is to 
been extended to cover the many frozen blastocysts currently in storage, as well 
as those at almost all stages of development following fertilization.  For 
simplicity, this Article refers to all of the entities in question prior to the fetal 
stage as embryos.  A “fetus” is the label given to the entity from eight weeks 
after fertilization until birth, at which point it is referred to as a “baby” or 
“neonate.”  I do not believe that the use of the terms (or of proposed different 
terms) necessarily alters the debate.  Certainly there are misleading terms, 
including, for example, “developing baby,” which imply that the entity in 
question is closer in attributes to a child than to original gametes (that is, 
sperm and egg).  But it does not appear to make much difference in people’s 
ethical analysis whether the entity is called a blastocyst, preembryo, or an 
embryo. 
 3. See discussion of Rios case infra Part III.C. 
 4. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (2000). 
 5. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (reporting, within the 
appellate case, on trial court proceedings). 
 6. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425-27 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 7. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 8. Progenitors are the woman and man who supply the egg and the sperm 
cells, respectively. 
 9. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998). 
 10. Bohn v. Ann Arbor Reprod. Med. Assocs., Nos. 213550, 213551, 1999 
Mich. App. LEXIS 2210, at *16 (Dec. 17, 1999). 
 11. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 269 (Wash. 2002). 
 12. 400,000 Embryos and Counting, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2003, at A34.  
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children, and the legal framework is one of custody, best interests, 
and protection of embryo rights.  If property, the analogy is to 
gametes, or sperm and eggs, and the legal framework is one of 
control, contract, and protection of progenitors’ rights.  Most 
commentators and courts assume that an entity falls under either a 
property framework or a person framework13 (or perhaps something 
new),14 but not a combined property and person framework.15  This 
Article takes a novel approach.  It argues that “person” and 
“property” are not mutually exclusive designations, and one might 
recognize both property interests in, and personhood interests of, 
certain entities.16  Depending on the outcome of the personhood 
analysis, either property interests will control (if there are no 
personhood interests), or the property interests will be balanced 
against the personhood interests (and in some cases the personhood 
interests may completely trump the property interests).  For those 
situations in which the property interests control, general precepts 
Should artificial womb technology advance, even greater numbers of 
extracorporeal embryos will exist, at multiple stages of development.  See, e.g., 
Sacha Zimmerman, Fetal Position, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 18, 2003, at 14 
(discussing ectogenesis, or the development of an artificial womb). 
 13. A handful of commentators have struggled to define embryos’ legal 
status, most of them framing the debate in terms of either property or persons.  
See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357 
(1986); Phillipe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 
195 (1996); Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193 (1997); 
Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal Status of 
Fetuses and Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703 (1999); John A. 
Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 
437 (1990). 
 14. See, e.g., Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, 
the Progenitors, and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and 
Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257 (1990) (rejecting property law, but also 
acknowledging that current jurisprudence cannot support the definition of a 
preembryo as a person with independent rights).  Martin and Lagod argue that 
the preembryo is unique, should be treated with “serious” and “special” respect, 
and warrants a unique legal status that is neither property nor person.  Id. at 
276-78. 
 15. At least one author argues that the dichotomy between persons and 
property is illusory with respect to embryos and that the label is less important 
than answering the questions: “[C]an rights in a person be owned, and can 
property own property?”  Guzman, supra note 13, at 200.  Guzman begins the 
debate but does not develop it fully.  Although I agree with her reframing of the 
questions, I do not think we should be quick to discard the existing property 
and person categories. 
 16. But cf. id. at 250-51 (concluding that the issue of what to do with 
genetic material can be solved without deciding if the material is a person or 
property). 
BERG-ROLLUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
2005]  PROPERTY INTERESTS AND EMBRYOS 163 
 
of property law should apply, including rules relating to 
transferability, abandonment, and inheritance.  Thus, rights 
regarding embryo disposition should mirror legal rights to 
disposition of other personal property.17
This Article is the first in a two-part series.  Its focus is on 
substantiating the argument that property law is the appropriate 
basis for legal analysis in this context.  It is appropriate in four 
senses: (1) it provides a conceptually better fit than the competing 
procreative liberty framework; (2) it is normatively compelling, 
based on the application of property theories; (3) it provides a 
descriptively accurate explanation for many of the courts’ actions in 
embryo disposition cases (despite some of those same courts’ 
unwillingness to use the term “property”); and (4) it allows courts to 
draw on an existing framework of property law to resolve disputes.  
A companion Article considers the application of personhood law to 
embryos and fetuses and explores the limitations an entity’s 
personhood interests place on the exercise of others’ property 
interests. 
Part I of this Article starts with the proposition that property 
theory is a better framework under which to evaluate interests in 
embryos and fetuses than procreative liberty theory.  Part II 
examines theories of property, concludes that there are normative 
grounds for recognizing property interests in embryos and later 
developed entities, and argues that these interests cannot be 
ignored regardless of the entity’s personhood status.  Although the 
notion that embryos are property is not itself new, the analysis by 
courts and most commentators has been fairly superficial.18  
Property is simply assumed to be the default category, once the 
personhood approach is rejected.19  By contrast, this Article stresses 
 17. See discussion infra Part III. 
 18. There is only one law review article, a student note, which suggests 
that a theoretical analysis of property interests in one’s body and body parts is 
necessary.  David A. Rameden, Note, Frozen Semen as Property in Hecht v. 
Superior Court: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward, 62 UMKC L. REV. 377 
(1993). 
 19. Once the entity is determined not to be a person, attention shifts to the 
entities involved in the dispute who are persons—the progenitors—and their 
rights and responsibilities.  NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 1 REPORT OF THE HUMAN 
EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, at x, xii (1994) (concluding that health needs of 
women, children, and men must be given priority because prior to implantation, 
the embryo does not have the same moral status as an infant or child, a 
conclusion based on “the absence of developmental individuation in the 
preimplantation embryo, the lack of even the possibility of sentience and most 
other qualities considered relevant to the moral status of persons, and the very 
high rate of natural mortality at this stage”); cf. The Inhuman Use of Human 
Beings: A Statement on Embryo Research by the Ramsey Colloquium, at 
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that there is a normative basis for recognizing individual property 
interests in this context, regardless of the answer to the personhood 
question.  Part III considers some of the implications of a shift from 
a procreative liberty framework to a property framework for courts 
deciding cases.  It argues that property theory provides a basis for 
evaluating “parenthood,” and thus, property theory can determine 
standing both to assert control over embryos and to make child 
custody claims.  It also points out some of the basic property laws 
that can apply in this context.  Part IV begins to describe the 
integrated property-personhood framework and asserts that its 
rudiments already exist in the case of parents and children.  Part V 
concludes.  The companion article picks up at this point to develop 
the integrated framework in more detail.  It explores the personhood 
interests of embryos and fetuses, and evaluates the potential 
limitations those interests place on the exercise of parental property 
interests. 
The approach outlined below and in the companion piece is sure 
to challenge commentators on all sides of the debate.  For those who 
argue that embryos and fetuses are persons, the strong property 
interests described below will likely be unpalatable.  Moreover, the 
implications of the combined framework for limiting those property 
rights as the entity develops will likely be unacceptable to advocates 
of extensive procreative choice during pregnancy.  Nevertheless, the 
framework described here provides a more accurate understanding 
of the legal issues and, therefore, may facilitate the eventual 
resolution of the protracted battle regarding the legal status of 
embryos and fetuses. 
I.     MOVING FROM PROCREATIVE LIBERTY TO PROPERTY 
There are a number of reasons why it is important to consider 
the application of property theory in this context.  Most importantly, 
there are compelling normative reasons—a point developed in Part 
II.  Before reaching those, however, this Part identifies some of the 
conceptual reasons why the current legal framework, procreative 
liberty, is unsatisfying.  Even if procreative liberty rights have a role 
to play in the embryo debate, the legal analysis must also take 
property rights into consideration. 
The concept of procreative liberty arose initially out of a series 
of cases in the twentieth century dealing first with forced 
sterilization, then access to contraception, and eventually rights of 
abortion.20  The most prominent advocate for extensive protection of 
http://www.firstthings.com/ ftissues/ft9501/articles/ramsey.html (Jan. 1995) 
(concluding that the NIH’s embryo research report is morally repugnant). 
 20. A full exploration of procreative liberty is beyond the scope of this 
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procreative liberty, John Robertson, describes the framework as 
encompassing two interrelated freedoms—the right to avoid 
reproduction and the right to procreate.21  He argues that 
procreative liberty is an extremely important right “because control 
over whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, to 
dignity, and to the meaning of one’s life.”22  This Article does not 
dispute the importance of procreative liberty, or necessarily its role 
in a variety of cases.  Rather, it argues that using procreative 
liberty, alone, is not sufficient to evaluate the interests involved in 
disagreements over embryos (and may not be sufficient for resolving 
the abortion debate, although that point will have to be argued in a 
subsequent article).  Even if there are procreative liberty interests 
involved in these situations, there are also property interests at 
issue, and focusing on these property interests provides a better 
basis for legal analysis. 
Interestingly, even though Robertson argues that procreative 
liberty rights extend to the use of assisted reproduction and thus 
that “[n]oncoital reproduction should . . . be constitutionally 
protected to the same extent as is coital reproduction,” he does not 
analyze embryo disposition solely under procreative liberty.23  
Instead, he acknowledges that “[t]he question of decisional authority 
is really the question of who ‘owns’—has a ‘property’ interest in—the 
embryo.”24  Although he bases his arguments in favor of strong 
property rights on the need to afford control over reproductive 
options, in the end, his analysis of issues such as rights to discard 
and freeze embryos is reduced to consideration of the embryos’ 
symbolic value, and not the procreative liberty rights of the 
individuals involved.25
Article.  The following is a brief list of the primary jurisprudence.  Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a statute authorizing surgical 
sterilization of certain criminals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(articulating the right to privacy under which procreative liberty falls); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to privacy in 
reproductive choice to unmarried individuals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(describing a right to abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977) (invalidating a statute regulating access to contraceptives); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding Roe in 
part, but rejecting the trimester framework and articulating the “undue 
burden” test); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (reiterating the “undue 
burden” test). 
 21. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 25-32 (1994). 
 22. Id. at 24. 
 23. Id. at 39. 
 24. Id. at 104. 
 25. Id. at 109-10. 
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In fact, there are a number of reasons why the procreative 
liberty framework fails to provide a good mechanism for resolving 
disputes in the embryo context.  First, procreative liberty arguably 
is strongest in situations where procreation has not yet occurred—
for example, sterilization and contraception.26  Although the concept 
has been applied in the abortion context, that area may be better 
served by an analysis of bodily integrity than procreative liberty.27  
Regardless of whether this proves true, when an embryo has been 
created through the consensual actions of the gamete28 providers, 
those providers have “procreated,” or at least begun the process of 
procreation since it does not appear to be a single point in time 
event.29
Moreover, stretching the concept of procreative liberty to cover 
decisional authority over embryos may undermine its use in other, 
more appropriate, contexts.  Thus, for example, opponents of 
extensive recognition of procreative liberty may succeed in placing 
limitations on its exercise when applied in the embryo context 
(particularly since a larger number of people believe that embryos 
and fetuses have greater moral significance than gametes) and those 
limitations may shape the use of the procreative liberty framework 
in other contexts such as contraception.  The ultimate result could 
be a diminution of liberty for the progenitors.  For example, 
legislation that limits the destruction of embryos may limit the use 
of the “morning after pill” and other contraceptives that work to 
prevent pregnancy immediately after fertilization.30  In contrast, the 
 26. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted 
Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 
UTAH L. REV. 57, 96-98 (stating that “[t]here are a number of reasons to doubt 
whether the right to procreate extends far enough to encompass ART decisions,” 
in part because “most ART decisions are made before the pre-embryo is ever 
implanted”). 
 27. See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 98 (1998).  
Evaluation of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article.  See also Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971) 
(describing the bodily integrity argument). 
 28. Eggs and sperm are gametes. 
 29. Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary defines procreation as “[t]he act 
or state of conceiving and giving birth to an infant,” and notes that it is 
synonymous with “reproduction.”  TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
1565 (18th ed. 1997).  Black’s Law Dictionary states simply that procreation is 
“[t]he generation of children.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (6th ed. 1990).  
The American Heritage Dictionary states that it means “to beget offspring.”  
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 988 (2d college ed., 1985). 
 30. Etienne-Emile Baulieu, RU-486 as an Antiprogesterone Steroid; From 
Receptor to Contragestion and Beyond, 262 JAMA 1808, 1813 (1989) (suggesting 
that we distinguish contraception—the prevention of fertilization—from 
contragestion—the prevention of gestation). 
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use of a property framework may lead to additional protections of 
individual rights since the courts may accord greater deference to 
specific property rights of progenitors than to their general liberty 
rights.31  Professor Murray Rothbard suggests that in order to avoid 
both confusion and a weakening of the right in question, general 
liberty rights should always be framed in terms of specific property 
rights.32  In this sense, one might consider the actualization of 
general procreative liberty interests to be the recognition of specific 
property interests in the resulting embryo. 
Finally, the procreative liberty framework results in problems 
not encountered under a property framework, as it leads courts to 
consider inappropriate factors in their analysis of dispositional 
issues.  There have been few reported cases involving cryopreserved 
embryos.  Those that do exist usually involve disagreements 
between divorcing progenitors regarding implantation, donation, or 
destruction.33  The courts in these cases have, at least superficially, 
accepted a procreative liberty framework of analysis,34 giving 
priority to the party who wishes not to reproduce.  While the 
decisions suggest that a valid agreement might control disposition, 
thus far, no court has upheld an agreement to implant or donate 
 31. See generally, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (describing the historical 
protections given to property rights); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING 
PROPERTY 14 (1993) (“In our legal/moral culture, rights that are considered 
‘property’ are taken more seriously than any general rights to ‘liberty.’”). 
 32. ROTHBARD, supra note 27, at 113-14.  Rothbard uses the example of 
rights of free speech and argues that to understand the general liberty right one 
must think in terms of specific property rights.  The right to free speech is 
really a collection of property rights, such as the right to rent a hall for a 
political candidate.  Id. 
 33. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 
(N.J. 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2000), rev’d, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).  In the first decision of its kind, in 
February 2005, an Illinois trial court allowed a couple’s wrongful death suit to 
proceed after a fertility clinic mistakenly discarded their stored embryo.  The 
judge based his decision on his interpretation of an Illinois statute, claiming it 
defines human beings as embryos from the moment of conception.  Lindsey 
Tanner, In Wrongful Death Suit, Judge Rules Test-Tube Embryo a Person; 
Chilling Effect Feared for Fertility Industry, Stem Cell Research, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2005, at A3.  It is unclear whether the ruling will be upheld on 
appeal. 
 34. See Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other 
Party to Custody of Frozen Embryo, Pre-embryo, or Pre-zygote, in Event of 
Divorce, Death, or Other Circumstances, 87 A.L.R.5TH 253, 261-62 (2001) 
(discussing the balance between the Constitutional procreative liberty right of 
one progenitor to reproduce and the other progenitor’s right not to reproduce). 
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over the objections of one of the progenitors.35  Only in one case, 
Litowitz v. Litowitz, did an appeals court explicitly state that the 
contractual agreement always controls disposition.36  By contrast, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in J.B. v. M.B. argued that 
agreements could always be changed until the actual disposition of 
the embryos, based on public policy concerns.37
In contrast to the analysis used in these cases, the framework 
described in this Article would focus on the property interests, 
rather than procreative liberty interests, of the progenitors.  It 
potentially would reach similar results in some of these cases since 
contractual agreements would be enforceable, but it would have 
some significant differences.  The first is that the relative weight of 
the right not to reproduce as compared to that of the right to 
reproduce will not play a role in disposition.  Under a procreative 
liberty framework, rights not to reproduce are given greater weight 
than rights to reproduce.  Reasons for this may include the general 
preference in our society for negative rights over positive rights and 
the compounding issue of women’s rights of bodily integrity.  But the 
issue of extra-corporeal embryo disposition has nothing to do with 
bodily integrity.  Moreover, at the point of pregnancy, when bodily 
integrity does come into play, it can be considered, in and of itself, 
separate from a property analysis and should not be evaluated, via 
proxy, through a balancing of rights to reproduce or not. 
A secondary implication of the move away from basing decisions 
on the right not to reproduce is that contractual agreements to 
implant in one of the progenitors would be enforceable, even should 
one of the parties later change his or her mind.38  Of course, 
implantation into a currently objecting woman would not be 
permissible, but this is an issue of bodily integrity—a topic best left 
for another article.  Contracts to donate spare embryos, allowing 
 35. The court in Kass upheld the agreement to donate the embryos for 
scientific experiments.  696 N.E.2d at 180-81.  The court in A.Z. refused to 
uphold the contractual agreement to give the embryos to the wife for 
implantation over the husband’s objections.  725 N.E.2d at 1058-59. 
 36. 10 P.3d at 1090-93. 
 37. 783 A.2d at 719. 
 38. See, e.g., Sara D. Petersen, Comment, Dealing with Cryopreserved 
Embryos upon Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving Party 
Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065 (2003).  Peterson discusses the A.Z. case in 
which the court declined to follow the pre-existing agreement to give the 
embryos to the wife for implantation.  Except for the initial version of the 
contract, all subsequent versions were signed by the husband while blank and 
later filled in by the wife.  Id. at 1092.  Although the court suggested it based its 
decision on the determination that the parties lacked intent to create a binding 
contract, it seemed more concerned about enforcing these agreements over one 
party’s objections. 
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another couple to attempt implantation, should also be enforceable.39  
Since the parties have already “procreated,” the issue is not one of 
forcing procreation, but of property disposition and contractual 
enforcement.  Despite the concern some courts articulate that a 
“party will have been forced to become a biological parent against 
his or her will,”40 there is no right to avoid biological parenthood if 
you have willingly41 participated in procreative activities.  In other 
words, the right in question is really a right protecting against 
unwilling procreation, not unwilling parenthood once procreation 
has occurred, despite the rhetoric used.  Likewise, a man who finds 
his partner has conceived after traditional intercourse cannot claim 
he has a right not to be a parent.42
Not only should the “right not to reproduce” not play a role in 
the resolution of embryo disputes, but also the “availability of 
alternative means of reproduction” is not relevant.  Thus, for 
example, it should not matter in the Davis v. Davis case that the 
wife had alternative means of reproducing.43  The parties in embryo 
disputes are concerned with the disposition of specific embryos; they 
are not debating either progenitor’s right to reproduce generally.  An 
emphasis on procreative liberty clouds the analysis and draws 
attention away from the true issues.  In many of the cases, the 
parties may not even be seeking to use the embryos themselves for 
reproduction, but rather seeking either destruction or donation for 
use by others or in research.  The issue is how to give adequate 
 39. If both progenitors change their minds and decide to do something else 
with the embryos, this should be permissible, as would any normal change in a 
contract upon agreement of all parties. 
 40. J.B., 783 A.2d at 718. 
 41. Nor can you always avoid biological parenthood even in cases of 
unwilling procreation, although you may be able to avoid the legal obligations of 
parenthood. 
 42. The right not to reproduce is not given priority for a pre-viable in utero 
fetus since the man’s interest in not becoming a parent does not suffice to 
terminate the pregnancy or even avoid his parental obligations to a later born 
child.  Although I will not go into detail here, I would argue that a woman who 
finds she is pregnant also cannot claim she has a right not to be a parent—at 
most she can claim that her right to control what happens to her body means 
that she can refuse to continue the pregnancy. 
 43. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).  The Davis case 
involved divorcing parties who had seven frozen embryos.  Mr. Davis wanted 
the embryos destroyed.  Mrs. Davis initially wanted to use the embryos herself, 
but at the time of litigation was asking to have the embryos donated.  Id. at 
589.  The court determined that Mr. Davis’ right not to reproduce outweighed 
Mrs. Davis’ right to reproduce (particularly since she was not seeking to use the 
embryos herself).  It also implied that the case might have been decided 
differently if Mrs. Davis did not have alternative means to achieve parenthood.  
Id. at 604. 
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weight to the property interests in the embryos, not how to 
effectuate either party’s procreative liberty interests. 
In all, a property framework provides a more neutral basis for 
legal analysis, compared to the more value-laden procreative liberty 
framework.  Moreover, it allows courts to draw on a vast array of 
established rules for resolving disputes.  The explicit adoption of a 
property framework by courts will lead to greater predictability in 
case outcomes and, thus, should facilitate the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies.  The remaining implications of the shift 
to a property framework will be explored in more detail in Part III.  
Part II, below, examines different theories of property rights to show 
there are normative reasons for recognizing property interests in 
embryos. 
II.     PROPERTY THEORY44
Before beginning, I want to stress that the issue for this Part is 
not whether an entity should be labeled “property,” but rather 
whether legally recognizable property interests exist.45 Thus, some 
people respond in horror exclaiming: “Surely an embryo is not 
merely a piece of property!”  Likewise, the use of the term “person” 
when applied to a group of undifferentiated cells may seem insulting 
to others that lay claim to the categorization.  One need not talk 
about status per se,46 but instead, the question is best framed as 
 44. This Part draws heavily on exiting work by property law scholars.  One 
professor notes:  
[A]nything which one writes must largely be made up of a restatement 
of what has already been said by others in another form.  Each one of 
us may congratulate [her]self if [s]he has added something of value, 
even if that consists only in so rearranging the data which others have 
accumulated as to throw new light upon the subject—a light which 
will serve to illuminate the pathway of those who come after us and so 
enable them to make still further progress. 
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 5 (Walter 
Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). 
 45. Professor Anita L. Allen notes that “[t]he concepts of property and 
ownership are elastic enough to let us buy and sell anything we want.  We 
cannot simply look to the language of law to know where to draw the lines.”  
Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 139, 146 (1990).  My argument below does not depend simply on the 
terms themselves; in fact, the use of the terms may be problematic.  Instead, I 
argue that the normative theories that explain whether and when to accord 
private property rights can be applied to determine rights in the context of 
embryos and fetuses. 
 46. The focus on “status” is misleading since it implies that the legal label 
is equivalent to the entity in question.  Others have stressed this distinction, 
particularly in the area of property, by noting that one should speak of property 
rights—not of a thing being property.  See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO 
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whether there are interests in the entity that can and should be 
defined in terms of property and, thus, basic precepts of property 
law applied.47
In order to answer this question, the following subparts first 
consider the meaning of property and, second, apply property 
theories to embryos and fetuses.  I conclude that there are 
normative grounds for recognizing property interests in these 
entities, and although these interests may need to be balanced 
against the entity’s personhood interests, personhood interests do 
not negate the property interests.   
A.   The Meaning of Property 
The categorization of something as “property” under the law is 
different from what it was two centuries ago,48 and thus may be 
different from the term’s historical plain usage.  Property does not 
refer to absolute dominion over a “thing,”49 but rather “a set of legal 
relations among persons” relating to things.50  As a result, ownership 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 159-60 (1988) (citing Bentham and Macpherson).  Part of the 
difficulty is the intertwined nature of the terms and their legal implications.  
Thus, property may have no objectively identifiable characteristic except that it 
is treated as property under the law, and likewise, “persons” may simply be 
those entities treated as persons under the law.  For example, Hohfeld uses the 
term “property” as an example of a term with “no definite or stable connotation” 
both for lawyers and laypersons.  HOHFELD, supra note 44, at 28. 
 47. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 13, at 454-55 (stating that although the 
terms “ownership” and “property” when applied to embryos may lead to 
misunderstanding, “the bundle of property rights attached to one’s ownership of 
an embryo . . . [is a] property interest nonetheless”). 
 48. Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 325-26 (describing the shift from a 
Blackstonian conception of property to a Hohfeldian one).  Vandevelde notes 
that the categorization of something as property is often a shorthand for 
recognizing individual rights and limits on state sovereignty.  Id. at 328.  More 
broadly, he notes one danger in the initial shift away from the Blackstonian 
requirement of a “thing” to the protection of a valuable interest was the 
potential for property law to swallow everything and thus no longer itself be a 
useful means of demarcation.  Id. at 329.  Although I agree with Vandevelde’s 
descriptive analysis of the shift in the meaning of the categorization “property,” 
I do not evaluate his claims regarding the problems with this shift. 
 49. Id. at 328. 
 50. Id. at 330.  The essential attributes of ownership are custody, control, 
and disposition.  Accordingly, the bundle of rights called “property rights” 
include (1) the right to possess the property or thing; (2) the right to use and 
enjoy it; (3) the right to exclude others; (4) the right to transfer ownership by 
gift or by sale; (5) the right to encumber it; (6) the right to dispose of it after 
death; and (7) the right not to have it expropriated by the government without 
payment of compensation.  A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-24 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). 
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rights are often defined as a “bundle of rights”51 and include an 
amalgam of different types of rights, some or all of which may be 
exercised in a particular situation.  Different types of property may 
give rise to different legal rights and protections.52  Thomas Grey 
expresses concern about implications of the historical shift for the 
usefulness of “property” as a legal concept.53  Other scholars have 
shown that property is still a definable, and functional, legal 
category.54  Evaluation of these debates is beyond the scope of this 
 51. One author takes issue with the bundle-of-rights metaphor and 
suggests instead that property is best conceptualized as a “web of interests.”  
Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of 
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002). 
 52. See UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 75 (2000) (“A piece of land, a book, a water 
basin, an animal, a computer program, a human embryo, a television frequency, 
a portfolio account, a negotiable instrument, a cubic meter of clean air, and so 
forth are all scarce resources . . . [and] may be considered as objects of property 
rights.  Of course, all such different objects of property rights do not and should 
not share the same legal regime.”); Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 330.  But see 
generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that once something is designated as 
property, all the rights of property apply). 
 53. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in MODERN 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 291 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000).  
Grey’s focus is on the centrality of property in political capitalist theory.  
Interestingly, he cites Rawls’ Theory of Justice as evidence for how unimportant 
property rights have become in liberal theory.  Id. at 303.  For a contrasting 
view, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).  A full analysis 
of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article.  See also Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.  957, 989 n.113 (1982) (arguing that 
the concerns that lead to the shift away from an object-ownership conception 
and towards a bundle-of-rights conception can be addressed by emphasizing the 
difference between fungible and personal property). 
 54. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (arguing that although property law and tort law 
may not be exclusive categories, property rules can be clearly distinguished 
from liability and inalienability rules).  Using a Hohfeldian framework, 
property rights are multital rights—rights which are comprised of many similar 
rights against an indefinite number of people.  HOHFELD, supra note 44, at 72 
(“A multital right, or claim, (right in rem), is always one of a large class of 
fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a 
single person (or single group of persons) but availing respectively against 
persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people.”) (footnotes and 
emphases omitted).  These contrast with in personam rights, or Hohfeld’s 
paucital rights—rights against a specific person or set of persons.  Id.  (“A 
paucital right, or claim (right in personam), is either a unique right residing in 
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Article, but even though there are clearly problems with defining 
property now that it applies not merely to dominion over a thing, 
property does not cease to be a useful legal concept.55  Property law 
continues to provide a framework for judges deciding cases, and 
theories of property continue to provide normative bases for 
allocating public-versus-private rights of control.56
For purposes of this Article, the phrase “property rights” refers 
to rights of control relating to external, rather than internal, things 
(that is, related to the internal self).  They might be contrasted with 
liberty rights (which are internal and generally thought to be 
inalienable), tort rights (which provide remedies for violations of 
liberty or property interests), and contract rights (which provide a 
basis for individuals to exercise control over other rights).57  The 
strongest property interest is labeled “ownership,”58 or an 
individual’s legal right “to exercise the maximum degree of 
a person (or group of persons); . . . or else it is one of a few fundamentally 
similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively against a few definite 
persons.”) (footnotes and emphases omitted). 
 55. Jennifer Nedelsky suggests “it is the myth of property—its rhetorical 
power combined with the illusory nature of the image of property—that has 
been crucial to our system.”  NEDELSKY, supra note 31, at 224. 
 56. See Radin, supra note 53, at 989-90 (noting furthermore that “[i]n the 
real world, the categories of ordinary language and culture seem reason enough 
to maintain the distinction [between property and non-property rights]”); see 
also MATTEI, supra note 52, at 2 (stating that “[p]roperty law can thus be 
described as the formal or informal set of restrictions on the use of scarce 
resources that recognizes and permits the exercise of private decision making 
by the individual”). 
 57. See, e.g., DALE A. NANCE, LAW AND JUSTICE: CASES AND READINGS ON THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 361-62 (2d ed. 1999) (citing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT 
AS PROMISE (1981)).  Fried himself noted: 
The law of property defines the boundaries of our rightful possessions, 
while the law of torts seeks to make us whole against violations of 
those boundaries, as well as against violations of the natural 
boundaries of our physical person.  Contract law ratifies and enforces 
our joint ventures beyond those boundaries. 
FRIED, supra, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).  Nance goes on to note that “[a]lthough 
such inalienable rights [of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness] were often 
included in the notion of ‘property’ by Enlightenment theorists such as John 
Locke, the modern tendency is to use the term property to refer 
paradigmatically to rights that are, at least ordinarily, alienable.”  NANCE, 
supra, at 362. 
 58. Ownership may include rights to possess, use, manage, transfer, collect 
income or capital, or use as security.  Honoré, supra note 50, at 112-24.  Distinct 
from ownership, there are also rights of “possession” and “capture,” for example.  
See MATTEI, supra note 52, at 79 (defining possession as “a property right whose 
protection by the legal system is simply less intense than that of ownership”).  
Mattei also stresses that with respect to movable property, however, the 
distinction between possession and ownership is less clear.  Id. at 88. 
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formalized control over a . . . resource.”59
For most things referred to as property, one need not ask 
whether the designation is appropriate, but merely to what extent 
individual rights should be recognized or given priority.  In contrast, 
the debate about embryos and fetuses has more to do with whether 
the property framework is appropriately applied in the first place 
and only secondarily about the extent of individual rights once 
recognized.  It is certainly conceivable to talk about embryos in 
terms of property60—after all, the debate itself, regardless of which 
side one takes, has been structured in exactly those terms.61  And 
property law seems intuitively applicable to situations in which 
there is a dispute over an actual thing.  Embryos, since they exist in 
corporeal form, are in some ways easier to analyze under property 
rules than intangible intellectual property—they can be considered 
either under a “thing-ownership” conception or a “bundle-of-rights” 
conception.  Furthermore, even if embryos in the womb are not the 
kind of “thing” that is traditionally thought of as being covered by 
property law, advances in technology that resulted in the existence 
of extracorporeal embryos may have changed this.62  Prior to this 
development, the concept of procreative liberty may have sufficed to 
protect the interests of the progenitors.  But the advent of new 
reproductive technologies, and the more recent demand for embryos 
as both a valuable resource in and of themselves (as a source of 
children for infertile couples) and a means to obtain other valuable 
things (as a source of stem cells,63 for example), create an impetus to 
 59. MATTEI, supra note 52, at 77.  Even ownership rights have limits.  
Under the American system, “the owner is always restricted by a requirement 
of reasonable use.”  Id. at 147. 
 60. This is separate from the issue of whether the embryo itself can have 
property interests (usually framed in terms of inheritance interests), a question 
that has been answered by commentators in the affirmative.  See, e.g., Guzman, 
supra note 13; Sharona Hoffman & Andrew P. Morriss, Birth After Death: 
Perpetuities and the New Reproductive Technologies, 38 GA.  L.  REV.  575 (2004). 
 61. But see Parsi, supra note 13, at 706 (arguing that the person or 
property metaphors are inappropriate and that we should think of our 
obligations concerning embryos under a stewardship metaphor). 
 62. See, e.g., Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of 
Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the 
Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q.  123, 128-29 (2001) (arguing that technology “can 
affect what rights can be placed into the bundles of sticks,” “can make it 
possible to subdivide property rights within a particular bundle in new ways,” 
and “may make different forms of property possible”). 
 63. Harvesting stem cells from embryos results in the destruction of the 
embryo in question.  There is a great deal of debate about whether this is 
ethical and whether embryos should be created specifically for this purpose, 
rather than using spare embryos leftover from fertility treatments.  
Complicating the issue is the potential to create embryos using cloning 
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untangle rights in the embryo from the woman’s property right in 
herself (including, for example, the right to control what happens to 
her own body), which is a source of the procreative liberty interest.64
B.   Application of Property Theories to Embryos 
There are quite a few theories explaining property rights, and 
each has different implications for the legal recognition of those 
rights.65  Moreover, there is extensive literature evaluating the 
different theories, which will not be recounted here.  The goal of this 
subpart is to show that there are property interests in embryos, but 
not to resolve debates about which property theory is best overall.  
To the extent that one favors a particular theory over another (or a 
variation of a theory not recognized here), that theory should be 
applied in this context. 
The following subparts are divided into three parts, mirroring 
the three categories into which theories about property can be 
broken down: utilitarian, natural rights, and personality.66  Others 
techniques, thus assuring that the stem cells in question are a perfect match to 
the cloned individual.  The tissues and organs derived from these stem cells 
could be used in the treatment of the individual in question (so-called 
“therapeutic cloning”), obviating the need for immunosupressants to prevent 
transplant rejection.  This issue may be time limited since there is current 
research into developing alternative sources of embryonic stem cells that would 
not require the creation or destruction of human embryos.  See, e.g., Nancy 
Touchette, Cultured Eggs Could Defuse Stem Cell Politics, Genome News 
Network, at http://www.genomenewsnetwork.org/articles/05_03/sc_eggs.shtml 
(May 3, 2003) (describing a new process used to obtain mouse egg cells from 
existing cultured stem cells without creating a new embryo); Sylvia Pagán 
Westphal, ‘Virgin Birth’ Method Promises Ethical Stem Cells, 
NewScientist.com, at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn3654 (Apr. 
2003) (describing the process of parthenogenesis where an unfertilized egg 
retains a complete set of chromosomes, instead of the usual one-half, and begins 
developing as if fertilized and noting that it is a source of stem cells but could 
never develop into a human being). 
 64. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 62, at 134 (stating that “with further 
increases in demand and encounters with scarcity, efficient behavior dictate[s] 
further unbundling of specialized rights”).  Basically, my argument stresses 
that the location of the embryo does make a difference in the rights analysis—
not because the personhood interests of the embryo change, but because the 
bodily integrity interests are different. 
 65. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Theorising Private Property Rights 3 (Aug. 
1996) (working paper, on file with author) (stating that “different types of 
theory generate peculiar understandings of private property rights as well as 
distinct conclusions concerning why and to what extent these rights ought to be 
protected”). 
 66. Id. at 4.  There are also what might be referred to as “analytical 
theories of property rights,” such as the one put forward by Calabresi and 
Melamed integrating property and torts.  See generally Calabresi & Melamed, 
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describe the categories as utility, labor, and liberty,67 where “liberty” 
matches the prior reference to “personality.” Each of these general 
categories of property theories is applied to embryos.  I conclude 
that there are strong normative grounds for recognizing private 
property interests in embryos and, subsequently, in developed 
fetuses. 
1.   Utilitarian or Economic Theory 
Utilitarian theory focuses on maximizing the greatest good for 
the greatest number68 and is often translated into economic terms as 
creating the most economically efficient system.69  Although not all 
utilitarian theories are economic ones—greatest good can be 
evaluated in non-monetary terms70—the vast majority of property 
theorists who use such a framework draw from the law-and-
economics tradition.71  In simplistic terms, the economic approach to 
property starts with the assumption that property law should be 
structured to maximize social wealth.72  It usually further postulates 
that individuals will act in an effort to maximize their economic self-
supra note 54 (describing our legal system as one in which entitlements are 
either protected by property rules, liability rules, or rules of inalienability). 
 67. LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 99 (1977). 
 68. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1979) (1861). 
 69. There may be no unitary law-and-economics approach to property law.  
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, The Meaning of Property “Rights:” Law 
vs. Economics? (Jan. 11, 2001) (working paper; draft on file with author).  
However, Harold Demsetz’s seminal article provides a general basis for 
understanding property rights from an economic perspective.  Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).  Demsetz 
recently expanded on his theory in Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The 
Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653 
(2002). 
 70. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 6 (1996) (noting that 
“Amartya Sen, a prominent economist and social theorist, defines individual 
and aggregate social value as welfare maximization without supposing utility to 
be intrinsically characterizable in money terms”). 
 71. Economic theory is just a subset of utilitarian theory in which greatest 
good is defined in economic (monetary and efficiency) terms. 
 72. There is variation on this absolute maximization that looks at achieving 
pareto-optimal outcomes.   
A rearrangement of resources is considered Pareto-superior to the 
status quo if no one is harmed by the change and at least one person 
is better off. . . . [The Kaldor-Hicks variation defines] a reallocation of 
resources as efficient if it enables the gainers to compensate the 
losers, whether or not they actually do so. 
Ellen Frankel Paul, Natural Rights and Property Rights, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 10, 15 (1990) (arguing that property rights should be grounded in natural 
rights theory). 
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interests—their private wealth.  Although each individual may act 
in a rational way to maximize his or her interests, the end result 
may not maximize the sum of individual interests—the collective 
wealth.73 The theory provides not only an explanation for why 
individuals act as they do with respect to group resources, but also a 
solution (including, for example, creation of private property) in 
situations where the actions lead to inefficient results. 
Although no one has applied a utilitarian property analysis 
specifically to embryos, a number of law-and-economics scholars 
have considered the application of a law-and-economics framework 
to the creation of children.  Gary Becker does so with respect to the 
creation of families and provides a complex economic analysis to 
explain why families choose to have children.74  His use of a market 
framework describes children in terms of their economic value.  
Likewise, Judge Richard Posner has framed family relationships in 
economic terms75 and even suggested the creation of a free market in 
babies to address the current “shortage.”76  Similarly, a number of 
people have argued for recognition of personal property interests in 
organs, based on economic rationales.77  In particular, there have 
been suggestions that allowing the sale of organs would solve the 
 73. David Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, in THE COMMON LAW AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 109 (Roger E.  Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000). 
 74. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991).  His purpose is to 
explain differences in fertility over time and not to make normative assertions 
about the worth of children.  As Radin points out, he uses a market metaphor to 
make predictions about behavior.  RADIN, supra note 70, at 1. 
 75. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 165-70 (5th ed. 1998). 
 76. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby 
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). 
 77. See, e.g., Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then 
Hecht: Isn’t It Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and 
Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 151 (2002); Roy Hardiman, Comment, 
Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the 
Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1986).  Some 
authors have tried to distinguish between property and quasi-property, possibly 
either because of their discomfort applying the term “property” to body parts or 
because they are trying to stress that the property interests in question were 
extremely limited.  See, e.g., Jordan & Price, supra, at 165-71 (discussing first 
the advantages and disadvantages of recognizing property rights in tissues and 
cells and then the specific advantages of recognizing “right of commerciality” in 
tissues and cells).  They define “quasi-property rights” as providing limited 
rights to control the disposition of objects.  Their quasi-property interest in 
human body would include the next of kin’s right to possess a corpse for burial, 
the right of freedom from obstruction in exercising this possessory right, and 
the right to donate organs.  Id. 
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transplant shortage.78  These authors assume that it is appropriate 
to speak about children (and body parts) in economic terms79 and 
attempt to show that application of an economic framework will lead 
to a better explanation of people’s actions and to solutions for some 
of the existing problems. 
The difficulty of such analysis lies generally in the difficulties of 
applying consequentialist80 theories such as utilitarianism—how do 
we measure and weigh the utility or disutility to any one 
individual?81  Even if we can figure out how to apply the theory, 
evaluations depend on our ability to gather and interpret empirical 
data—something almost always lacking in utilitarian proposals.  
Moreover, although it may be possible to answer the questions 
raised by utilitarian theory, the lack of moral language in the 
embryo context may be especially disconcerting, regardless of one’s 
feelings towards utilitarianism more generally.82  Utilitarian 
theories can explain the existence of property rights and provide a 
basis for determining when private control should be allowed but 
fail to provide a satisfying analysis regarding whether certain 
things, like embryos, should be considered under a property 
framework at all.  Utilitarian theories assume that property rights 
should always be created/recognized to the extent that the result 
 78. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Organ Sales, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1984, at 22 (reviewing the arguments that allowing 
a market in human organs would address the current transplant shortage). 
 79. Cf. JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE, LOVE & ECONOMICS 13 (2001) (arguing 
that an economics framework cannot and should not be applied to family 
relationships and while advocating a libertarian approach to the relations 
between the state and the individual/family, she notes that there are significant 
obligations of the individual to the family, founded upon love and generosity, 
that are necessary for society to function). 
 80. Consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism, determine the ethical 
or correct course of action by looking at the consequences of different 
alternatives.  The alternative that leads to the best result, however defined 
(such as most happiness or greatest good), is the correct one.  In contrast, the 
theories below, natural rights and liberty (personality), are not consequence 
driven, but deontological.  Deontological theories evaluate alternative courses of 
action based on the importance of particular values, without regard to the 
consequences of promoting those values.  For example, Immanuel Kant argued 
that determining the moral or right action in a particular circumstance depends 
on one’s ability to universalize the rule governing the act, otherwise known as 
the “categorical imperative.”  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 26, 30 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 
1981) (1785). 
 81. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. 
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST (1973). 
 82. Id. at 103. 
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produces better overall welfare.83
In this sense utilitarian property theories are both infinitely 
useful and fundamentally problematic.  Applying utilitarian 
property theory to embryos prompts the question—should we be 
considering embryos in terms of benefit maximization or efficiency?  
Utilitarian property theory always answers this question “yes” and 
then proceeds to analyze whether or not the benefits/efficiency gains 
support recognition of private property rights.  Many people may 
find this result unsatisfying.  As a result, some scholars combine the 
utilitarian approach with one of the natural rights theories 
described below.84  Natural rights theory provides a basis for 
determining the initial “should this be considered property” 
question, and then utilitarian theory provides a basis for evaluating 
specific rules.  But others feel the theory does provide a sufficient 
basis for analysis and point to the underlying strength of the 
utilitarian approach.  The fact that it is not dependent upon an 
explanation of initial acquisition of property rights means it can be 
applied to any existing structure of rules and laws, even if those 
initial rules were developed without utilitarian evaluation. 
Regardless of its limitations, wealth maximization theory 
enables us to answer some questions of whether and what legal 
property protections should apply.  Justifications for recognizing 
private property interests under an economic utilitarian approach 
refer to the so-called “tragedy of the commons,” which highlights the 
potential for multiple parties with interests in a public resource to 
overexploit the resource while failing to take into account potential 
negative outcomes.85  In economic terms, without property rights, 
individuals will fail appropriately to internalize externalities or 
social costs.86  Each individual maximizing her own interest will 
attempt to exploit the resource to such an extent that it will be used 
up, thus removing the potential for resource enjoyment from 
everyone, including the individual in question.  A system 
 83. The theory may not provide a basis for outlawing slavery, for example.  
Duxbury, supra note 65, at 7. 
 84. Richard Epstein does this.  EPSTEIN, supra note 52; Richard A. Epstein, 
Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. 
L.Q.  667 (1986); see also Schmidtz, supra note 73.  It may be that a utilitarian 
economic theory provides the best descriptive mechanism to understand the 
implications of recognizing different private property rights, and thus should be 
used to determine what kinds of property rights in embryos should be given 
legal protections once a normative justification for having such rights is 
established. 
 85. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 
(1968). 
 86. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
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recognizing private property rights enables other individuals to 
charge the individual seeking to exploit the resource for using their 
shares, thus forcing the exploiter to internalize, or consider, all 
applicable costs in decision making.87  The contrasting “tragedy of 
the anticommons” recognizes that allowing too many individuals 
control over property can also be economically inefficient—tying up 
the property and making it impossible for any person to make full 
use of it.88  Under this model, rules should be designed to maximize 
the most efficient use of the resource in question and avoid both 
commons and anticommons problems. 
Utilitarian theories do not recognize any inherent property 
rights of individuals but assume that such rights can be created (or 
not) according to the outcome that is sought (such as maximization 
of benefits of the resource).  Applying utilitarian property rights 
theory leads us to ask questions about whether there are utility 
harms or benefits to allowing ownership of the entity.89  For 
embryos, the question would be whether recognizing private 
property rights would lead to greater overall welfare.  Unlike the 
theories discussed below, utilitarian theory does not necessarily give 
preference to the progenitors or others involved in the creation of 
embryos.  The issue is what incentives will result from the creation 
of various private property rights.  If embryos are regarded as 
alienable property of the progenitors, then some people will be more 
likely to create embryos.  On the contrary, if embryos are not 
regarded as the private property of the progenitors, a number of 
couples may be disinclined to create them in the first place.  Part of 
the issue will be determining whether encouraging the creation of 
embryos results in overall social utility.  There are at least two 
bases upon which to argue that it does.  The first stems from the 
idea that decisions about reproduction are a crucial part of self-
development, following up on the procreative liberty discussions.  
Affording property rights over embryos will give progenitors greater 
control.  The result will be both to encourage more progenitors to 
create embryos (a good for them) and to encourage progenitors’ self-
development (a good for society).  The second basis assumes that the 
creation of additional embryos has the potential to create more 
 87. “A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to 
achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”  Demsetz, supra note 69, at 
348. 
 88. The “anticommons” is the flip side of the commons problem—it is the 
situation where restrictions on individual use become so onerous that the 
resource cannot be used at all efficiently.  Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 621, 624 (1998). 
 89. Duxbury, supra note 65, at 7. 
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children and to facilitate certain kinds of research, both of which are 
good for society.90
2.   Natural Rights or Labor-Based Theories 
Unlike utilitarian theory, natural rights theory can explain 
initial acquisitions of property rights and provide a moral language 
for answering questions regarding the application of property theory 
in the first place.91  These theories start with the assumption that 
property rights are not the product of government, but arise 
naturally out of individual actions.92  The most prominent of natural 
rights property theorists, John Locke, argues that the primary 
reason for the formation of society is individuals’ acceptance of the 
need for governmental protection of inherent property rights.93  He 
includes both ownership over the self and ownership over the 
products of one’s labor as initial aspects of property.94  The natural-
rights-labor approach may be a more promising theory under which 
to evaluate embryos than utilitarianism, as it at least starts with 
the question of whether an individual has a right to something we 
might call property. 
Should embryos be considered part of one’s own body and, thus, 
property as is any other body part linked to the whole? The initial 
answer appears to be yes.  The embryo is made up of parts of the 
 90. This is not to say that application of utilitarian theory could not result 
in limitations on the number of embryos created.  But such a rule, like a rule 
governing the resolution of disputes over embryos, would be subject to welfare 
maximization analysis, and the ultimate outcome will depend on how welfare is 
defined and whose welfare is counted. 
 91. Duxbury, supra note 65 at 7-8. 
 92. Natural rights theories also sometimes talk in terms of inherent rights. 
 93. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 295 (London 1821) (1690) 
(“The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and 
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.”). 
 94. See BECKER, supra note 67, at 32-48 (discussing Locke’s theory); 
Duxbury, supra note 65, at 8-9 (same).  Many others have pointed out the 
problems with Locke’s theory and offered various modifications.  For example, 
Robert Nozick takes issue with Locke’s assertion that the investment of labor 
always results in property rights, rather than simply the loss of the labor value, 
although he accepts Locke’s initial proposition of self-ownership.  NOZICK, supra 
note 53, at 174-78.  Nozick, however, believes property rights are justified under 
the “principle of justice in acquisition.”  Id. at 151.  Nozick’s principle identifies 
the circumstances under which someone can acquire property rights in 
something, based not simply on the addition of labor value.  This principle, like 
Locke’s labor theory, provides a basis for property rights separate from their 
designation by the state.  I will not review all of the objections or variations of 
Locke’s labor theory here.  For my purpose, it is enough to note that it (and 
other natural rights theories) provides a normative basis for property interests 
in embryos. 
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progenitor’s bodies—the egg and sperm.  So, to the extent that one’s 
own body is considered property, so too can the products of one’s 
body be considered property.95  But it is not clear that the notion of 
self-ownership under natural rights theories, including Locke’s, is 
really meant to encompass bodily ownership, as opposed to 
ownership over the person or personal identity.96  If the latter, the 
notion seems to be more akin to a concept of liberty than property.97
Even if gametes are not considered a part of the body, the 
“labor” involved in the production of an embryo may be an 
“investment” that could be recognized via a property interest in the 
resulting entity.98  Others have pointed out that children would be 
included as property under such a theory.  Lawrence Becker asserts 
that “if anything is clearly a product of (one’s body’s) labor, a child 
is,” although he then goes on to argue that this is why a labor theory 
of property is flawed.99  Becker’s argument raises an important point 
about persons and property—the property interests in the embryo 
will be limited by the nature of their justification.  If property rights 
in oneself are inherent, then recognition of derivative rights from 
labor investment in the creation of an entity will necessarily be 
limited by that entity’s own property interests in him- or herself.100  
It would be inconsistent to hold otherwise, since the result would 
undermine the initial justification for granting property rights.  As 
Margaret Radin states, “[I]f Locke’s claim is that property is 
justified because it is a condition necessary to produce or sustain 
free individuals, his theory carries the inherent limitation that any 
form of property incompatible with free individuals is not 
 95. For example, Robertson appears to combine both the concept of 
ownership over gametes and rights of procreative liberty in order to find a 
property interest in the resulting embryo.  Robertson, supra note 13, at 457 
(“The gamete providers’ claim to ownership derives from their original 
ownership of their gametes and their right to decide whether to have biologic 
offspring.”). 
 96. For an analysis of the difference between the two, see WALDRON, supra 
note 46, at 177-83 (arguing that Locke was referring to ownership of personal 
identity since creation of the body (and thus ownership) belonged to God). 
 97. Id. 
 98. There is a slightly different “labor” investment in creating an embryo in 
vivo through copulation, rather than in vitro.  And there is additional labor 
investment in gestating, birthing, and raising a child. 
 99. BECKER, supra note 67, at 38.  This raises interesting questions about 
ownership of persons—an issue which will be explored in greater detail in a 
subsequent article. 
 100. Id. at 39.  Becker argues that parents in fact have a duty to recognize 
the liberty interests of the child, and this duty may either override or cancel out 
the parents’ right.  Id. 
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justified.”101  Although recognizing property interests in embryos 
(and possibly fetuses and children) is not per se inconsistent with 
the initial theory, as the personhood interests of the developing 
entity are recognized, they will naturally limit other individuals’ 
property interests in the entity. 
3.   Liberty or Personality Theories 
Although natural rights theories are potentially applicable in 
this context, personality theories also provide a basis for assessing 
property interests in embryos.102  Personality theories are initially 
drawn from the work of Hegel, who claimed “private property is 
essential for the development of freedom and . . . serves as a medium 
through which the individual becomes a person.”103  More recently, 
Charles Reich stated that “property performs the function of 
maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by 
creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the 
owner.”104  Radin further develops the personality idea in her work 
on property and personhood.105  She analyzes different theories of 
property in depth and concludes that the personhood perspective of 
property can be used normatively to determine whether and how 
property rights should be recognized in particular contexts.106  She 
 101. Radin, supra note 53, at 979. 
 102. Duxbury, supra note 65, at 14-15 (noting the multiplicity of theories 
that could fall under this heading).  Not everyone would make the distinction 
between personality theories and natural rights theories.  According to Jeremy 
Waldron, both Locke and Nozick argue for what he terms “special-rights-based” 
theories of private property.  Arguments for private property are special right 
based if the interest in question “arose out of some contingent event or 
transaction.”  WALDRON, supra note 46, at 117.  In contrast, “[a] general-right-
based argument . . . is one which does not take the importance of such an 
interest to depend on the occurrence of some contingent event or transaction, 
but attributes that importance to the interest itself, in virtue of its qualitative 
character.”  Id. at 116.  He cites Hegel as an example of a general-rights-based 
theory of property, although he acknowledges that such categorization is likely 
to be controversial.  Id. at 343. 
 103. Duxbury, supra note 65, at 15 (“A person . . . has as his substantive end 
the right of putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it 
his[.] . . . This is the absolute right of appropriation which man has over all 
‘things.’”) (quoting GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT § 44 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821) (second ellipse in 
original).  Waldron categorizes Hegel’s theory as general rights based, but he 
acknowledges that such categorization is controversial.  WALDRON, supra note 
46, at 129, 343. 
 104. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). 
 105. Radin, supra note 53; see also RADIN, supra note 31 (reprinting the 
Stanford Law Review article, but clarifying certain points in the introduction). 
 106. Hegel’s theory does not provide a basis for understanding specific 
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argues that property rights fall along a continuum from personal to 
fungible and to the extent that they fall closer to the personal end 
they should not be overridden.107  Personal property is that property 
that is closely linked to the development of the self, and thus rights 
to that property should be given greater protection than rights to 
fungible property.108  Placing something on the continuum is, to a 
certain extent, subjective, and individuals may even conceive of 
something as personal in one context and fungible in another.  Blood 
and hair are good examples since while in or attached to the body 
they are personal (and perhaps not even conceived of as separate 
from the self), but out of the body, they may be donated or sold.109  
However, the designation of something as personal or fungible is not 
simply made on a case-by-case basis and “instead depends upon 
whether our cultural commitments surrounding property and 
personhood make it justifiable for persons and a particular category 
of thing to be treated as connected.”110
The personality theory of property poses problems for those who 
believe that property is a more unitary concept and everything 
designated as property is entitled to an invariant core set of 
protections.111  Radin’s approach has also been criticized based on 
concerns that social consensus on a fungible-personal continuum 
does not actually exist.112  Furthermore, her analysis of 
commodification may understate its prevalence while at the same 
time overestimate its force.113  Stephen Schnably, for example, 
argues that people have the capacity to resist commodification or 
decommodification, regardless of the imposed legal regime114—an 
argument that may have significant implications for considering 
embryos as property under a personality theory.  If one of the 
property rights.  That is, his theory is that some property is necessary to be a 
conduit of one’s will, but not necessarily that a specific thing must be regarded 
as property. 
 107. Radin, supra note 53, at 986. 
 108. Fungible property is property “that is perfectly replaceable with other 
goods of equal market value.”  Id. at 960. 
 109. RADIN, supra note 31, at 17.  Radin takes the view that “personal 
endowments and capacities” are not severable and thus not property.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 18. 
 111. For example, Richard Epstein, who uses a combined natural-rights-
theory and utilitarian/economic approach, argues that once designated as 
property certain rights automatically follow, and these rights are the same with 
respect to all things that fall under the heading of property.  EPSTEIN, supra 
note 52. 
 112. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of 
Radin’s Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993). 
 113. Id. at 404-05. 
 114. Id. at 395-96. 
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concerns about alienability of embryos is the commodification of 
developing human lives (and thus, by implication, the 
commodification of later developed persons),115 showing that people 
can resist commodification, even while recognizing alienable 
property interests, should counteract many objections.116
Despite problems, personality theories provide a strong basis for 
recognizing property interests in this context.117  According to 
procreative liberty arguments, control over procreation, in this case 
control over what happens to embryos created with one’s gametes, is 
crucial for development of the self.  A personality theory of property 
takes this one step further stating that private property interests in 
the embryo are necessary to provide the liberty for the development 
of the self.  Recognition of property rights in this context 
acknowledges the significant role procreation plays in the 
development of self-identity and is both more conceptually 
appropriate than procreative liberty arguments and possibly a 
legally stronger basis on which to rest the rights in question.118  Like 
the labor theory, personality theories carry inherent limitations.  To 
the extent that the recognition of property interests hinders the 
development of self-identity or liberty, they should be restricted. 
C.   Summary 
There are interests in embryos that are appropriately 
characterized as property interests and should be recognized under 
the law.  Analysis under utilitarian theory reaches this result, 
although the specific rules will depend on analysis of the 
consequences.  Moreover, application of both labor and personality 
theories likewise result in the conclusion that there are property 
interests in embryos.  The next step is to consider some of the 
 115. MATTEI, supra note 52, at 76 (stating that “all legal systems resist the 
idea of considering as the object of property rights certain kinds of material 
things that may have a very high economic value,” including body parts and 
embryos under this heading, and stating that the reason is an underlying fear 
of commodification, despite the fact that “the notion and the language of 
property may offer some insights”). 
 116. For an interesting taxonomy of commodification, see Note, The Price of 
Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003).  The author argues that anti-commodification 
arguments divide into coercion arguments and corruption arguments, and 
corruption arguments can be divided again into conventionalist and essentialist 
positions.  Id. at 689.  Schnably’s argument appears to focus on the corruption 
harms from commodification.  Schnably, supra note 112. 
 117. Radin may take issue with the use of her theory in this way given her 
discussions of incomplete (contested) commodification.  RADIN, supra note 70, at 
21. 
 118. See supra Part I. 
BERG-BOXUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
186 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol.  40 
 
implications of recognizing these property interests. 
III.     APPLICATION 
Having set forth the property framework, it is useful at this 
point to consider its implications for actual cases.  I will focus most 
of the discussion below on cases involving extra-corporeal embryos.  
These are the least complex, as they do not involve either bodily 
integrity interests of a pregnant woman or highly developed legal 
personhood interests of the entity in question.  The latter point 
follows from the assumption that if children are not granted full 
legal personhood rights,119 then less developed entities such as 
fetuses and embryos should have no greater rights (and would likely 
have fewer).  Although an entity’s personhood interests may limit 
the application of property interests, it is worthwhile considering 
how the framework would function in the absence of personhood 
interests.  In other words, I will assume for the moment that 
embryos do not have personhood interests and apply the property 
framework.  The companion article develops this argument in 
greater detail.  Even should one disagree with this point, the 
property framework still applies, albeit with additional limitations 
on the exercise of the property rights.  Such limitations will also be 
explored in the companion article.  The Subparts below consider the 
initial implications of the shift from a procreative liberty framework 
to a property framework.  Specifically, they address who can assert 
the property interests in question, and whether and how such 
interests can be transferred. 
Subpart A draws from property theories to identify those 
individuals who would have a basis for asserting a property interest 
in embryos and fetuses.  This is a crucial issue since it will 
determine who has standing to bring a suit involving the embryos or 
subsequently born children.  Subpart B considers whether the 
property interests are transferable (thus widening the groups of 
potentially “interested parties”), and Subpart C suggests some 
traditional property law concepts that might be used in dispositional 
cases.  Finally, Subpart D applies the general rules to the handful of 
reported cases on embryo disposition. 
A.   Who Can Assert an Initial Property Interest? 
One of the most important issues to resolve in disputes over 
embryos, and eventually the subsequently born children, is who can 
assert claims—in other words, who has standing to bring a 
 119. See, e.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 27, at 107-12. 
BERG-ROLLUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
2005]  PROPERTY INTERESTS AND EMBRYOS 187 
 
lawsuit.120  Only “interested parties” may assert a claim for either 
control over embryos or custody over children.121  Before an 
individual can even assert that the best interests of the child will be 
served by affording him or her custody, that individual must have 
standing to do so.  There are good reasons for this limitation since 
we do not want to have all parents at risk of having their children 
taken away simply because some other adults believe they can 
provide better for the children.  Likewise, random individuals may 
not assert a claim for embryos, or request specific embryo 
dispositions.  Even if embryos were to have personhood interests, 
the parties who have standing to assert a claim should be limited, as 
it is with children.  The current legal framework restricts interested 
parties to individuals who can assert parentage under one of three 
tests—genetic, gestational, or intentional.122  Although the tests are 
helpful, they fail to solve all problems in cases of unusual 
reproduction.  Application of property theories to identify those 
individuals who can assert a valid property interest both provides a 
theoretical basis for using the three specific tests and potentially 
allows other individuals who do not specifically fit one of the tests to 
assert a claim. 
There are a variety of parties that might claim to have a 
property interest in the embryo that would form the basis of 
dispositional control, the foremost of whom will be the progenitors 
who provide the gametes.  In those circumstances where the gamete 
providers include the gestating mother and the progenitors intend to 
rear the resulting child, the analysis remains relatively simple.  But 
 120. Describing this issue as one of “standing” may be incorrect despite 
many courts’ use of that term.  That is, the question may really be one about the 
merits of any one individual’s claim, rather than whether they have standing to 
assert the claim.  The analysis described in this Subpart does not change even if 
the “standing” label is not appropriate.  Personal Communication with 
Jonathan Entin, Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
(Oct. 5, 2004). 
 121. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 144 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that K.M.’s genetic connection to the children qualifies her “as an ‘interested 
party’ for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration of her status as a parent”), 
opinion superceded by 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004).  
 122. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782-83 (Cal. 1993) 
(distinguishing parentage determinations from custody determinations, stating 
that the best-interests-of-the-child analysis only applies in the latter, and 
arguing that parenthood, by contrast, can only be determined by showing a 
genetic, gestational, or intentional link).  The Johnson court adopted an 
intention test.  The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57 (2000) (considering the issue of grandparent visitation), indicates a 
willingness to consider visitation and possibly even custody claims of parties 
who do not fit one of the three “parenthood” tests. 
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when the gamete providers contract with an individual or couple 
who will rear the child, the situation becomes significantly more 
complicated.  As stated previously, utilitarian economic theory does 
not necessarily give preference to any of the involved parties, but 
rather focuses on the incentives created by different legal rules.  By 
contrast, application of personality or labor theories may have 
significant implications for the prioritization of rights.  The 
following subparts consider (1) the claims of the progenitors; (2) the 
potential claims of contracting parents; (3) the claims of 
surrogates;123 (4) the potential claims of scientists and physicians; 
and (5) the claims of rearing parents. 
1.   Progenitors 
There is nothing inherent in personality theory that would 
result in a preference for one or the other of the progenitors.  Either 
gamete provider can plausibly argue that embryos created with his 
or her genetic material are closely linked to the sense of self.  One 
could ask each progenitor to demonstrate how the embryo is linked, 
but this will be an extraordinarily difficult evaluation and open to 
subjective bias.  As a result, under a personality theory, claims of 
progenitors should be regarded as equal, and neither should be able 
to make decisions about an ex utero embryo without the consent of 
the other.124  I will discuss the implications of this consent issue in 
more detail under Subpart B, below. 
Labor theory, by contrast, appears to prioritize the claims of 
different progenitors.  The investment of the egg provider is 
significantly greater than the investment of the sperm provider and 
perhaps this should translate into greater property interests.125  But 
this is an artifact of biology—men cannot (even if they wanted to) 
 123. Resolving issues involving surrogates will necessarily entail moving 
beyond ex utero embryos and are addressed in greater detail in the companion 
piece.  But for purposes of this Article, I include the discussion of whether a 
surrogate can assert an initial property interest.  If so, then resolution of 
surrogacy disputes must consider the property interests along with the bodily 
integrity interests of the surrogates.  In the absence of property interests, the 
surrogate may still have bodily integrity interests if still gestating the fetus. 
 124. In other areas of property law, equal rights means that either cotenant 
can use the property, rather than that each has an equal veto.  This would be 
problematic in the embryo context since one “use” of the embryo would forever 
preclude another use, and thus, the determination by one party would 
extinguish the other party’s rights. 
 125. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 7, 7 (discussing the “sweat-equity” 
model to justify awarding female gamete providers greater control over the 
embryo because of her greater physical and emotional contribution to the IVF 
process). 
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invest more effort in the donation of their gametes.  Moreover, what 
“investment” is at issue?  Should investment be defined in terms of 
the physical energy necessary to create the gametes (women are 
born with all of their eggs, men must make sperm), or in terms of 
risks and discomforts in the retrieval of the gametes (harder for 
women than for men),126 or in terms of the psychological and 
emotional investment of either party (varied in each case)?  A labor 
theory does not necessarily differentiate between these 
investments.127  It may be that the egg provider is owed more for her 
investment, but that should not necessarily translate into greater 
property rights in the embryo.  For example, a number of 
commentators have argued for different compensation for egg versus 
sperm donation based on the unequal efforts involved.128  Moreover, 
a labor-theory approach may not give priority to one gamete 
provider over another if the expectation is that the parties will have 
equal interests in the resulting embryo (and eventual child). 
In other words, labor investment need not always result in 
property rights—it may merely result in payment for the investment 
or recognition of the investment.129  In part, the appropriateness of 
granting property rights depends on whether it is a property 
 126. In some cases, sperm harvesting can require more than masturbation, 
but the efforts and risk are still greater in the egg donation context. 
 127. One could use utilitarian theory to differentiate between investments.  
Thus, the individual’s willingness to sell the property (or willingness to buy) 
might be used to quantify investment. 
 128. See, e.g., Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Comment, To Have or Not to 
Have: Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes over Disposition of Frozen 
Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1995) (arguing that the woman should 
have greater authority because of her greater physical investment); Donna A. 
Katz, Note, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding 
Which Party Receives Custody of Frozen Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
623, 625 (1998) (arguing that the party whose infertility resulted in the use of 
IVF should have a greater say in the disposition of the embryos).  But see 
Petersen, supra note 38, at 1081 (refuting such an approach). 
 129. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 31, 41-42 (1989) (“Property rights . . . are not a fitting reward if the laborer 
does not want them . . . [or] the value of these rights is disproportional to the 
effort expended by the laborer.”).  Becker states that the labor theory might be 
reformulated to state: 
[L]aborers deserve something for their labor.  Perhaps in some cases 
what they deserve is property in the thing labored on; in other cases 
property in some sort of fee for the labor; and in still other cases, not 
property at all but simply the recognition, admiration, or gratitude of 
other people. 
BECKER, supra note 67, at 47 (emphasis omitted).  This line of argument may 
have interesting implications for gestational surrogacy and will be explored in 
more detail in a subsequent piece. 
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interest that is sought in the first place.130  This is not to say that the 
individual in question need articulate her interests in such terms, 
but if the expectation is clearly that property interests will not 
result, then granting property rights would be inappropriate.  
Moreover, even if there is an expectation of property interests, there 
may still be other reasons for denying that a great labor investment 
results in a greater property interest, either because the investment 
in question is not deserving of greater recognition, or because 
recognizing the property interest would interfere with another 
person’s property interests. 
Thus, for progenitors who plan to raise the resulting children, 
their interests will be regarded as equal131 under personality 
theories (and also likely utilitarian theories) but may vary 
depending on how “investment” is defined under a labor theory.  In 
most cases, both progenitors will have a say in disposition.132  I will 
return to this issue again under Parts III.B and III.C. 
2.   Contracting Parents 
The analysis so far assumes that the gamete providers are also 
the intended parents, and certainly in that situation their claims 
should receive priority over anyone else’s.  But what about the case 
where the gamete providers do not intend to interact with the 
embryo and resulting child?  The act of donation133 may be viewed as 
a voluntary transfer of the progenitors’ claims to the resulting 
embryo.  One argument in favor of strong protections around the 
donation process is based on the desire to make absolutely sure that 
the decision to donate is voluntary and informed (that is, 
autonomous) since the individuals will be giving up later claims to 
what has already been established as highly personal property.134
But even if the gamete donors do not explicitly relinquish 
 130. BECKER, supra note 67, at 53, 55. 
 131. See Robertson, supra note 13, at 457. 
 132. See, e.g., Bohn v. Ann Arbor Reprod. Med. Assoc., Nos. 213550, 213551, 
1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 2210, at *13 (Dec. 17, 1999) (upholding the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant medical center who refused to 
provide frozen embryos to the ex-wife for disposition without the ex-husband’s 
agreement). 
 133. Some commentators have suggested the term “vendor” be used instead 
of “donor” since gamete providers are paid.  See, e.g., Mary B. Mahowald, Genes, 
Clones, and Gender Equality, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 495, 523 n.172 
(2000).  Great care is taken to make this payment appear to cover services in 
providing the gametes (time, effort, risk) rather than the gametes themselves. 
 134. This is one reason that Coleman argues that embryos should be 
inalienable.  Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous 
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 55, 97-102 (1999). 
BERG-ROLLUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
2005]  PROPERTY INTERESTS AND EMBRYOS 191 
 
claims, can the “contracting parents”—individuals with no genetic or 
gestational connection to the embryo but who intend to raise the 
resulting child—assert a property claim under either the labor or 
personality theories?  With respect to labor theory, if, as suggested 
above, expectation of property rights plays a role in determining 
whether someone should be granted those rights, then one might 
argue that the property interests of the contracting parents should 
be recognized, but not that of the gamete donors (who may expect 
compensation, but by definition do not expect property rights).  The 
result may dovetail with some courts’ suggested “intent” test for 
determining custody in surrogacy cases—the parties who intended 
to raise the child are considered the child’s parents.135  The use of a 
labor theory would provide a theoretical grounding in property law 
for considering intent—arguably a stronger basis for recognizing 
rights of different parties in this context since there is considerable 
resistance to the idea that one can contract away procreative liberty 
interests as opposed to contracting away property rights.  Moreover, 
in familial arrangements related to embryo donation and creation, 
and also in some non-familial arrangements, many of the 
contractual elements may be missing.136  Property theory would 
function as a mechanism to allocate rights and interests even in the 
absence of a valid and enforceable contract. 
With respect to personality theory, the embryos in question are, 
 135. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998); Marjorie Schultz, Reproductive Technology and 
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 297.  No case has yet evaluated the claim between a gamete donor and a 
surrogate or intentional parent.  The cases that have declined to follow the 
California courts’ reliance on intention have not evaluated the property 
interests of the other parties, but rather determined custody (a child at the 
point of dispute, not an embryo) using the “best interests” of the child analysis.  
See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1252 (N.J. 1988).  The remaining 
disputes that have thus far appeared in the courts are between the male and 
female gamete donors. 
 136. Consider the case of Belsito v. Clark, where Mrs. Belsito’s sister, Ms. 
Clark, agreed to gestate the Belsito’s genetic child.  644 N.E.2d 760, 761 (Ohio 
Com. Pl. 1994).  In a dispute with the state (all parties agreed) over whose 
name should go on the birth certificate, the parties argued that there was no 
intention for Ms. Clark to have any parental rights or responsibilities.  Id.  
Designating the Belsitos as the parents, the court argued in favor of genetic 
parentage over birth parentage.  Id. at 762.  It explicitly rejected the “intent” 
test articulated by the California court in Johnson v. Calvert.  Id. at 764-66.  
But the genetic test would create a significant barrier to the use of donor 
gametes and makes less sense than recognizing the Belsitos’ property interests 
in the resulting child.  Certainly intent alone is not sufficient; however, the 
intent added to the Belsitos’ existing arguments about their genetic and other 
investments in the child were significant.  Id. at 767. 
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almost by definition, fungible, not personal property—the 
contracting parents may have chosen the donors for specific 
characteristics, but other donors may also meet their 
requirements.137  Nonetheless, some contracting parents may make 
the argument that the embryo in question is closely linked to their 
senses of self, and these arguments should be taken seriously.  It 
may be, however, that in a dispute the contracting parents have 
stronger arguments under a labor theory than under a personality 
theory, and gamete providers have the stronger arguments under 
the reverse. 
3.   Surrogates138
In some cases, the parties involved also include a surrogate, or 
woman who agrees to gestate the child.  In traditional surrogacy, 
this woman also provides the egg and is artificially inseminated 
with the sperm of the man who intends (along with his partner, 
usually his wife) to raise the child.  More commonly, gestational 
surrogates are now used—the woman has no genetic link to the 
resulting embryo and later born child—prompting some 
commentators to refer to the situation as “womb donation.”139  Both 
types of surrogates have claims under a labor theory after 
implantation.  Prior to implantation, even if the surrogate invests 
labor in readying herself for implantation (for example, in some 
cases, hormonal shots are required to create the uterine 
environment most conducive to fertilization or implantation) such 
investment would not yield an expectation of property interests in 
the specific embryo/fetus and resulting child.  Prior to implantation, 
it is hard to imagine the surrogate having any property claims, 
although she may have a claim to compensation for her time. 
Post-implantation, the surrogate’s labor investment may be 
significant.  Traditional surrogates have the added investment of 
providing the egg, although less of an investment than an egg donor 
who must provide the egg outside her body.140  There is no reason to 
 137. The same argument may not apply to adoption, once the potentially 
adoptive child has been identified. 
 138. Although the focus of this Article is on disputes involving extra-
corporeal embryos, I include this subpart on surrogates since their property 
interests may eventually come into play. 
 139. See, e.g., David H. Smith, Wombs for Rent, Selves for Sale?, 4 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 25 (1988). 
 140. In artificial insemination, the sperm is introduced into the woman’s 
vagina, and fertilization occurs inside the body, as it would with traditional 
intercourse.  For egg donors, the eggs must be ripened and harvested for 
fertilization outside the body.  Artificial insemination occurs according to the 
woman’s cycle and usually does not involve additional labor investments such 
BERG-ROLLUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
2005]  PROPERTY INTERESTS AND EMBRYOS 193 
 
think, however, that the added investment of a traditional surrogate 
makes a difference under a labor theory.  The real issue in any 
dispute is whether a gestational investment should be given greater 
weight than the less substantial labor investment of gamete 
providers.  As with debates concerning the relative weights of the 
investments of sperm versus egg donors, it is not clear whether we 
would want to give greater weight to gestational investment since 
even in traditional reproduction the woman has a greater labor 
investment via pregnancy than the man who provides the sperm.  
Although this may have been one basis for the historical preference 
in favor of granting custody to mothers of young children,141 modern 
courts recognize the involvement of fathers-to-be in addition to 
mothers-to-be, even if these investments cannot be quantitatively 
equalized. 
Even assuming that in traditional reproduction the woman’s 
pregnancy should not entitle her to greater property interests than 
the man in the resulting child, the question may be answered 
differently in the surrogacy context.  In other words, even if a labor 
theory would not give preference to the investment of the mother 
over the investment of the father in allocating property interests, it 
might reach a different result when comparing the investments of a 
surrogate and the investments of egg or sperm donors.  The time 
and effort involved in gestating and birthing a child is clearly more 
lengthy (and likely more strenuous) than that of any of the other 
parties involved in technological reproduction.  But there are two 
responses to this.  The first is that the investment of intentional 
parents may be just as significant, if not greater, than that of 
surrogates.  As pointed out earlier, the labor theory has no 
mechanism to weigh qualitatively different types of investments. 
The second response is that in the paid surrogacy context, the 
surrogate’s gestational investment is compensated, and thus, there 
may be no expectation of property interests in the resulting child.142  
Of course, this is exactly what many people find objectionable about 
surrogacy arrangements.143  Another way to think about this is to 
as hormone injections. 
 141. See Andre P. Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspective, 
133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1369, 1372 (1976). 
 142. Alternatively, the case may involve two “mothers”—where one provides 
the egg, and the other gestates the embryo/fetus, but both intend to rear the 
child.  Whether and how these interests should be translated into parenthood 
and custody terms depends on the specific circumstances of the case.  In 
essence, the evaluation should be no different than that involving a 
heterosexual couple where the “husband” contributes genetic material via 
sperm, and the “wife” uses an egg donor and gestates the resulting embryo. 
 143. See, e.g., PAUL LAURITZEN, PURSUING PARENTHOOD: ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
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view the surrogate as holding the embryo/fetus in trust for the 
individual who intends to rear the resulting child.144  For surrogacy 
arrangements that do not involve money, the surrogate may well 
have a continuing property interest that will have to be worked out 
with the individuals who intend to raise the child.  Since most of 
these cases involve family members or close friends, one would 
assume that the surrogate plays a continuing role in the child’s 
life.145  As time progresses, the rearing parents gain greater interests 
due to their continued investment (and the child’s personhood 
interests also come into play).146  It would be interesting, however, to 
consider how a case involving a sister or relative who engaged in 
non-compensated surrogacy would be decided if the surrogate 
claimed the right to be involved in the child’s rearing or even tried to 
claim an exclusive right to rear the child.  Exactly how disputes 
such as these are handled may depend on the potential 
transferability of the interests in question, a point I will return to 
below in Part III.B. 
Notwithstanding the transferability of the interests in question, 
both traditional and gestational surrogates may also claim property 
interests based on personality theory.  For the traditional surrogate, 
the embryo in question is less fungible.  While she may have 
accepted different sperm donors, she gestates only a child created 
with her egg.  Her claim looks similar to the claim of the natural 
mother in traditional reproduction.  This is one reason why courts 
may be more wary of upholding traditional surrogacy 
arrangements,147 which are now less common.  The gestational 
surrogate has a weaker argument based on a personality theory.  
While she may claim that her personality is closely linked to being a 
“surrogate,” it is not clear that it is closely linked to one particular 
embryo/fetus over another.  Again, surrogacy arrangements between 
family members or friends may give rise to stronger arguments 
about property interests under a personality theory since in those 
cases, presumably, the surrogacy is only undertaken for a 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 98-115 (1993). 
 144. See Margaret S. Swain & Randy W. Marusyk, An Alternative to 
Property Rights in Human Tissue, in LIFE CHOICES 410, 413 (Joseph H. Howell 
& William Frederick Sale eds., 1995) (stating that the health care providers 
involving in a transplant hold the tissue in trust for the recipient). 
 145. This is not always true, and not all family arrangements involve free 
choice.  See, e.g., Janice G. Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The 
Altruistic Woman, in LIFE CHOICES, supra note 144, at 302 (describing coercive 
family assisted-reproductive arrangements). 
 146. See discussion of rearing parents infra Part III.A.5. 
 147. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 
1994); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
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specifically designated embryo.  There is little to no legal evaluation 
of the potential claims of the different parties in so-called “gift” 
surrogacy, primarily because these tend to take place outside the 
legal forum and, thus far, have not resulted in courtroom disputes. 
4.   Physicians and Scientists 
Scientists who create embryos for research purposes may 
attempt to claim a property interest in the resulting embryos based 
on their investment, as may physicians involved in reproductive 
services.  Property rights based on investment are clearly not fitting 
in the case of physicians providing assisted reproductive services; 
instead, compensation is appropriate since that is what is 
expected.148  Compensation is a sufficient return for the labor 
investment and more appropriate than property rights in the 
embryos.149  Scientists who create embryos for research purposes 
may give rise to a slightly different situation.  In cases where the 
progenitors transfer their interests (in either the gametes or the 
resulting embryo), the scientists will have property interests—
although these may be limited interests in using the embryos only 
for research (or even a particular type of research).  I return to this 
issue below under Part III.B.2.  If the progenitors do not relinquish 
their property interests, could a scientist claim a property interest 
based on his or her investment?  The answer is likely to be no, since 
the labor theory would not recognize the unauthorized investment.  
In most cases, a simple bailment is created between property 
interest holders and the scientists/physicians/storage institution.150  
 148. Robertson, supra note 13, at 458. 
 149. Becker describes this as the “labor-desert” argument and claims that 
property rights are only appropriate when “nothing but property in the things 
produced will do, and when the value of such rights meets the test of 
proportionality.”  BECKER, supra note 67, at 53.  By contrast, when “substitutes 
will do every bit as well, [people] then deserve . . . an equally satisfactory 
substitute,” or “where property in the things produced is not what is sought at 
all, and cannot be an adequate substitute for what is sought, the laborers 
deserve something else (perhaps recognition, gratitude).”  Id. 
 150. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 422, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (stating that 
the storage facilities failure to transfer the frozen embryos to another infertility 
program in compliance with the progenitors’ wishes was at issue).  But cf. 
Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465, 467-68 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (upholding the 
trial court’s judgment that the IVF Center “appears to be the current owner of 
the zygotes.” (emphasis omitted)).  However, Cahill involved an explicit contract 
stating that the progenitors “agree that all control and direction . . . will be 
relinquished to the [IVF Center]” in the event of divorce.  Id. at 466.  Moreover, 
it is questionable whether either the trial or appeals court truly meant to 
recognize ownership interests since the appellate court stated that “[t]he trial 
court’s judgment made no determination as to the zygotes, in effect leaving that 
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The misuse or failure to release the embryos to the true property 
owners could lead to a lawsuit for conversion.151  But what about the 
case where the scientist does not know that the progenitors have not 
transferred their interests?  The doctrine of accession provides a 
basis for allocating property interests when an innocent party adds 
value to the property of another.152  But the doctrine may be 
extremely difficult to apply in the embryo situation since there is no 
easy standard for assigning value.  Generally speaking, issues 
relating to disputes between physicians/researchers and 
progenitors/intentional parents/surrogates will be framed as issues 
of interference with the latter parties’ property interests.  I will 
return to the issue of interference in Part III.C. 
5.   Rearing Parents 
In embryo disputes, there are no rearing parents.  But it is 
worth noting here that both the labor theory and a personality 
theory provide a basis for recognizing the interests of rearing or 
“social” parents.  Some individuals who take on a parental role will 
have no genetic or gestational connection with the child and may not 
have intended to be a parent at the moment of conception, but 
nonetheless intend to parent and raise the child at some point after 
birth.  These individuals’ property interests should be recognized.  
For example, in one recent case, a woman donated her eggs to her 
lesbian partner who gestated and birthed twins.153  The gestational 
mother was legally recognized as the mother on the birth certificate.  
When the couple split six years later, the egg donor claimed that 
because she had been rearing the children and they were genetically 
issue to be litigated between the parties.”  Id. at 468. 
 151. Conversion is “[a]n unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right 
of ownership.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th ed. 1990).  “Direct conversion” 
is “[t]he act of actually appropriating the property of another to his own 
beneficial use and enjoyment, or to that of a third person, or destroying it, or 
altering its nature, or wrongfully assuming title in himself.”  Id.; see also Judith 
D. Fischer, Misappropriation of Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of 
Conversion: A Relational View, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 381 (1999) (arguing that 
suits for conversion should be allowed, but that the remedy should be damages, 
not replevin (that is, the return of the misappropriated property)). 
 152. Also referred to as the “innocent improver doctrine,” accession rules 
allocate property rights and award financial renumeration in situations where 
one party has substantially added value to property that he was unaware was 
owned by another.  RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 6.6, 
at 58-62 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975). 
 153. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 144 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that K.M.’s genetic connection to the children qualifies her “as an ‘interested 
party’ for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration of her status as a parent”), 
opinion superceded by 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004). 
BERG-ROLLUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
2005]  PROPERTY INTERESTS AND EMBRYOS 197 
 
related to her, she should be considered a parent.154  The court 
rejected her claim stating that because she had no intention to be a 
parent at the time of egg donation, she was thereby not a parent 
under the law and thus had no standing to request custody or 
visitation based on the best interests of the children.155  By contrast, 
under the property framework, the egg donor might assert property 
interests based on her social parenting over the first six years of the 
children’s life.  Thus, even if her waiver of parental (property) 
interests based on genetics were deemed valid,156 she would have 
gained additional property interests due to her investment over six 
years of caring for the children as a parent.157  Although these 
interests would not determine custody—the children’s best interests 
would still control—they would form a sufficient basis to allow her 
to make a claim for parentage and, if she chose, request visitation, 
custody, or both. 
The application of property theories does not mean that anyone 
with a role in rearing a child has standing.  The intention of the 
individual at the time of the rearing makes a difference, as it does 
with physicians involved in assisted reproduction.  Hired babysitters 
and nannies certainly “parent” children, yet all parties involved 
expect monetary compensation for the investment, not parenthood 
status.  Once again, the informal family arrangements may prove 
hardest to navigate since the grandparents, aunts, or uncles who 
raise children may indeed expect to be considered a “parent” in some 
cases.158  Moreover, they may also claim property interests under a 
personality theory.  These individuals may indeed have property 
interests that should translate into legal recognition of parental 
rights. 
B. Are Property Interests in Embryos Transferable? 
1. Alienability 
Utilitarian theory would support transferability of embryos.  
 154. Id. at 141-42. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Part of the issue in the case was her intent at the time of the egg 
donation.  She claimed she always intended to be a parent, despite her signing a 
standard egg donation form, which indicated that the egg donor would play no 
parental role.  Id. at 147.  For discussion on the strict requirements for waiver 
or transfer of property interests in this context, see discussion infra Part III.B. 
 157. This approach is similar to that used in some jurisdictions that 
recognize “psychological parenting.”  See, e.g., In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 
P.2d 246, 256-57 (Colo. 1995). 
 158. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (discussing 
grandparent visitation rights). 
BERG-BOXUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
198 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol.  40 
 
Transfer would allow individuals who want to use the embryos to do 
so and those who would wish to avoid transfer to maintain control—
the end result would increase utility overall.  There is nothing 
inherent in utilitarian theory that would prevent embryos from 
being marketable,159 although the rules in this context would depend 
on evaluation of utility. 
By contrast, application of a labor theory may limit alienability 
because of limits on alienability of property interests in oneself.  The 
easy example is slavery—an individual may not contract away his or 
her sovereignty over the self.160  Embryos, however, are neither 
merely a part of the self, nor body parts or organs.  They are clearly 
severable and separate entities.  In vivo embryos and fetuses may 
present a more difficult case as these entities are severable, but the 
entity would not be able to survive the separation.  Even so, 
embryos and fetuses are not generally thought to be part of the self, 
but distinct entities, and thus a labor theory should not limit 
alienability. 
Personality theories also appear initially to have implications 
for alienability.  Radin claims that “inalienability might . . . attach 
to rights that are not too close to personhood to be considered 
property, but which are at the personal end of the metaphorical 
continuum running from personal to fungible.”161  However, she 
notes, such limitations on individual property rights “would require 
an objective moral consensus about the protected objects.”162  This is 
clearly not the case with respect to embryos—we may have societal 
agreement that embryos cannot be sold for money (although even 
this is not certain), but not that they cannot be transferred to others.  
 159. Alienability (or inalienability) “may mean nongivable, nonsalable, or 
completely nontransferable.”  RADIN, supra note 70, at 17.  I use alienability 
here to mean transferable, and separate out salability, which I also refer to as 
marketability. 
 160. For additional discussion on this point, see Jessica Wilen Berg, 
Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281 (2003). 
 161. Radin, supra note 53, at 986 n.101. 
 162. Id.  Others have argued that embryos should be inalienable under a 
procreative liberty analysis using reasoning that is comparable to Radin’s.  See, 
e.g., Coleman, supra note 134, at 91-95 (arguing that the law’s characterization 
of certain rights as inalienable applies to decisions about the disposition of 
frozen embryos because inalienable rights “generally relate to deeply personal 
decisions that are central to most people’s identity and sense of self”); accord 
Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), rev’d, 48 P.3d 
261 (Wash. 2002).  But cf. Petersen, supra note 38 (rejecting Coleman’s 
approach and advocating a contractual approach to resolving disputes between 
divorcing progenitors); John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989 (2001) (arguing that it is 
unfair not to uphold contractual agreements in this context).   
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In fact, there is nothing inherent in the recognition of property 
interests that requires that the property in question be salable.163
Concerns about alienability are often tied up with concerns 
about commodification, or the idea that “value can be expressed in 
terms of price.”164  The fear is that treating embryos as commodities 
that can be bought and sold will result in society devaluing human 
life or will alter how children will view their self-worth if they are 
aware they could be sold for a particular amount of money.165  But 
the sale of embryos does not result in the same social implications as 
the sale of children, given the vast differences between the 
undifferentiated multi-celled embryo and the resulting child.  
Moreover, alienability can be separated from marketability (or 
salability), as is currently the case with children.  Parents have 
property interests in children, but they cannot sell the children.  
However, interests in children can be transferred via custody 
agreements (where the parents decide who will raise the children) 
and also via adoption.166  So, even under a personality theory, 
property interests in embryos should be transferable. 
The bottom line is that property interests in ex utero embryos 
should be alienable under any theory of property,167 although there 
may be certain requirements around the contract process to ensure 
that it is voluntary and informed.  Advance agreements regarding 
disposition should be enforceable,168 but they may be subject to fairly 
rigorous documentation and oversight requirements to assure 
competent and autonomous decision making.169  There are numerous 
examples in both contract and property law in which additional 
 163. Alienability need not involve money transactions.  See, e.g., AMARTYA 
SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992). 
 164. RADIN, supra note 70, at 8 (noting that “commodification worries seem 
to occur only in conjunction with other worries about social wrongs” and that 
perhaps we should focus on those issues in addition to concerns about 
commodification). 
 165. Id. at 136-40. 
 166. One author points out that the fact that adoption is allowed brings into 
question what it is about child-selling and commodification that are a problem.  
Note, supra note 116, at 701. 
 167. This is in direct contrast to the view advocated by Carl Coleman, who 
frames the issue in terms of the inalienability of procreative liberty rights.  
Coleman, supra note 134. 
 168. See Robertson, supra note 162, at 995 (suggesting not only the use of 
advance directive and contracts to control future disposition, but also requiring 
that the agreements be knowingly and intelligently made and that the parties 
have relied on them). 
 169. Implied contracts or enforcing unwritten agreements would not be 
permissible.  Cf. Petersen, supra note 38, at 1085 (suggesting that contract law 
principles be applied even in the absence of a “precise instrument”). 
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protections are required in order to safeguard individual 
autonomy.170  This means that individuals can transfer their 
interests in gametes and the subsequently created embryos to the 
other progenitor, another person or couple, or even to a researcher.  
Whether embryos can be sold may depend on whether the sale of 
potential persons would have a negative effect on the rights and 
interests of current and future natural persons—a discussion that 
has thus far remained theoretical.171  The marketability of embryos 
may have different implications from the marketability of fetuses 
and children; the public policy concerns in the latter contexts are not 
the same as those in the former.172  But even if the answer to the 
sale question turns out to be no, property interests in embryos 
should still be transferable. 
2.     What Interest Is Transferred? 
If more than one person can have interests in an embryo, how 
can those interests be transferred?  Embryos cannot be divided—one 
half of an embryo has no value.  One way to consider the interests in 
the embryo is to think of them like a type of tenancy.173  If the 
original parties creating the embryo specify that each would have a 
right to the whole embryo should the other die, the interest is a joint 
tenancy with rights of survivorship; if not, the interest is considered 
a cotenancy.  In the usual case, the transfer of a property interest by 
one party to a joint tenancy converts the interests of both into a 
tenancy in common.  In other contexts where division of the property 
is not meaningful, for example joint-ownership of artwork, the 
interest in question remains an interest in the whole and the legal 
 170. Of course, any additional safeguards may, to some extent, lessen 
individual autonomy since, if the safeguards are not met, the contract may not 
be deemed valid.  See generally Berg, supra note 160 (discussing the application 
of safeguards in cases of waiver of constitutional or contractual rights). 
 171. There are other types of property that may not be sold but can be 
transferred (for example, through gifts).  Products made from endangered 
species may be gifted but not sold.  See Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1986, at 28, 28-29. 
 172. Children are not fungible, but embryos may be viewed as fungible.  In 
the embryo donation context, many parents look for certain characteristics of 
the gamete providers, and there are likely to be a number of different embryos 
that would fit the description.  Moreover, absent known health concerns, even 
progenitors may view the class of their genetic embryos as interchangeable, 
despite their potentially unique characteristics.  This does not mean that 
progenitors would be willing to swap the embryos with others, but that they 
view the choice between them as equal. 
 173. Joint tenancy, a property interest where the parties own “an undivided 
interest in the whole,” is one such property interest.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1465 (6th ed. 1990). 
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fiction of a “constructive trust” is applied.174  Unlike artwork, 
however, which can be sold and the proceeds divided, embryos may 
have no monetary value that can be split.  For example, if one of the 
progenitors transfers his or her interest to another party via sperm 
or egg donation, the transferee would then share a property interest 
in the whole embryo with the remaining progenitor, not just an 
interest in one-half the embryo, and the interests of the parties 
could not be disaggregated through sale and compensation.  A batch 
of embryos should not be divided between the parties since each 
progenitor’s interest in each embryo cannot be disaggregated.  That 
is to say, each progenitor has an interest in each embryo, and 
dividing up a group of embryos would treat the interests of each 
progenitor as interchangeable between the two progenitors.  It may 
be that a progenitor would view his or her gametes as 
interchangeable as to his or her own use.  Thus, if there are four 
embryos and the progenitor can choose two to implant, the choice 
may be random and not based on any particular characteristics of 
the embryos.  But that does not mean that the one-half interest of 
each progenitor can be swapped between the progenitors, giving 
each gamete provider a whole interest in two embryos apiece. 
An alternative to the joint tenancy is the tenancy by the 
entirety.175  Historically, this was a tool that allowed spouses to own 
property in the whole for their lifetimes, and upon the death of one 
spouse, the other would own the property in fee.176  Unlike the joint 
tenancy with rights of survivorship, “[n]either party can alienate or 
encumber the property without the consent of the other.”177  Only 
divorce could divide the interests into a tenancy in common.178  
About half the states no longer recognize tenancy by the entirety.179  
However, other states still recognize this type of tenancy, and it 
might prove particularly useful in the embryo context.  A state 
 174. See, e.g., Scull v. Scull, 94 A.D.2d 29, 36-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) 
(applying a constructive trust to jointly owned artwork in the event of the 
parties divorce).  Four elements are needed to apply the trust: “(1) a confidential 
or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise or agreement, express or implied, (3) a 
transfer in reliance upon said agreement, and (4) unjust enrichment.”  Id. at 33.  
The first three elements are met in the case of embryos.  The fourth is not, as 
embryos currently do not have any monetary value. 
 175. See Pat Cain, Two Sisters vs. a Father and Two Sons: The Story of 
Sawado v. Endo, in PROPERTY STORIES 97(Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss 
eds., 2004) (describing the history and current status of tenancies by the 
entirety). 
 176. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1465 (6th ed. 1990) (defining tenancy by the 
entirety). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Cain, supra note 175, at 113. 
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might, through statute, allow the parties to choose to create a 
tenancy by the entirety in an embryo, thus limiting the 
transferability of each party’s interests without the consent of the 
other party.  Moreover, even if one party does obtain consent for 
transfer, the person to whom the interest is transferred would be 
likewise bound and could not subsequently transfer that interest 
without consent.180  Ideally, such a statute would allow the use of 
this type of tenancy in any situation where an embryo is created, not 
just between married partners.181
Under a typical joint tenancy, either progenitor can choose to 
transfer his or her interests in the initial gametes or the resulting 
embryo, and the person or persons to whom the interest is 
transferred would have equal, but shared, interests in the whole 
embryo.  As a result, subsequent disposition determinations would 
need the consent of all parties with property interests, including 
those who acquired the interests through transfer.182  Moreover, in a 
dispute between a party whose interest arises via application of an 
initial property theory and a party whose interest is based on a valid 
transfer, both parties should have equal say in disposition.183  Other 
transfers of property interests in embryos may entail only partial 
rights transfers.  The recipient may have a limited property interest 
in the embryo, and that interest may not be subsequently 
transferable.  The court in Hecht v. Superior Court of the County of 
Los Angeles faced a similar question when it was asked to determine 
the disposition of vials of sperm left by the decedent.184  The court 
noted that the sperm could be used by, and was of value to, only one 
person, a girlfriend named in the storage agreement and the will.  
The court recognized the transfer of property interests, but stated 
 180. In other words, since the transferor did not have “unilateral alienation” 
rights to give, the transferee did not obtain them.  Id. at 115. 
 181. Vermont currently allows partners who enter into “civil unions” to use 
the tenancy.  Hawaii does the same for “reciprocal beneficiaries.”  Id. at 114. 
 182. It is possible that under a utilitarian analysis the requirement of so 
many people’s consent would be deemed an anticommons problem that should 
be avoided by limiting recognition of private property rights.  But this would 
depend on whether it is in society’s interest to promote the use of embryos.  See 
discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.2d 261 (Wash. 2002).  This case is 
discussed in more detail in Subpart D below. 
 184. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 223-24 (Ct. App. 1996).  The decedent listed his 
girlfriend on the donation form, named her as a beneficiary of the sperm in his 
will, and stated his wishes in a letter to his children.  Id.  The Hecht case 
followed a rather tortuous path after a property settlement agreement between 
the girlfriend and children was interpreted by a lower court to grant her use of 
only three of fifteen vials (corresponding to twenty percent of the estate under 
the settlement).  Id. at 224. 
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that the girlfriend “lack[ed] the legal entitlement to give, sell, or 
otherwise dispose of decedent’s sperm.”185  In other words, she could 
use the sperm herself, in accordance with the decedent’s intent, but 
that was the extent of her interest.186  In this sense, the Hecht court 
treated the transfer as a life estate determinable (the remainder 
going back to the decedent’s children).  Transfers of interests in 
embryos can be likewise limited. 
Most transfers will be either present time transfers or explicit 
death time transfers such as through a will.187  But in other cases, 
there may be an agreement about disposition that does not 
specifically contemplate the death of one of the property interest 
holders.  As noted above, rights of survivorship should not be 
assumed unless the parties make such determination clear.188  In the 
case of one party’s death, previous agreements allowing one party to 
gain complete control over the embryo should be enforced only if the 
intent is for the agreement to apply post-mortem.  Likewise, most 
courts view the continued enforceability of marital property division 
agreements, in the event of one party’s death, as resting on the 
parties’ intent when creating the agreement.189  Using similar 
reasoning, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in a recent 
case determining inheritance rights of children conceived after their 
father’s death, focused on the decedent’s intent to reproduce 
posthumously.190  If intent cannot be shown, the rules relating to 
 185. Id. at 226. 
 186. In limiting her use of the sperm, the court relied on “the decedent’s 
right to procreate.”  Id. at 226-27.  Without getting into an analysis of whether 
the right to procreate survives death, in this case the right does come into play 
since the decedent had not yet procreated as the dispute was over gametes.  
Although procreative liberty may limit the application of property theory in 
cases involving transfer of gametes, it should not play a role in embryo disputes. 
 187. Testamentary agreements to destroy embryos upon death should be 
upheld.  There is no public policy concern about waste that is sufficient to 
counteract the individual’s personal property interests in control in this context 
(likewise for destruction of gametes).  For a discussion of the issues raised by 
testamentary destruction of property, see Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, 
Want Not: Can the Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by 
Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. L. REV. 911 (2001). 
 188. This is true for all property—there is a presumption that the property 
is held as tenants in common unless a joint tenancy with survivorship rights is 
specifically created.  20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenency and Joint Ownership § 17 (1995). 
 189. In re Estate of Pavese, 195 Misc. 2d 1, 8-9 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2002); Michael 
R. Flaherty, Annotation, Separation Agreements: Enforceability of Provision 
Affecting Property Rights upon Death of One Party Prior to Final Judgment of 
Divorce, 67 A.L.R. 4TH 240 (1989). 
 190. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002); see also 
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
posthumously conceived children were natural biological children under the 
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disposition in the absence of agreement, as discussed below, should 
apply. 
C. Disposition in the Absence of Agreement 
In the ideal situation, a contract will be created addressing all 
lifetime and postmortem issues of disposition before the embryos are 
produced.  Even an agreement, such as a contract, will, or other 
advance directive, drafted after the embryos are created but while 
the progenitors or other interested parties are still alive, would be 
preferable to the absence of any advance agreements or instructions.  
But the reality is that many individuals fail to draft advance 
directives,191 and others do not draft wills.  And some contracts will 
either be silent on certain disposition situations, or unenforceable 
for a variety of reasons.  Thus, we need a mechanism to allocate 
rights in the absence of explicit arrangements.  General precepts of 
property law can be extremely useful here. 
As a starting point, we might specify default rules that match 
the majority of people’s expectations, assuming that those who do 
not agree will take steps (such as through a contract) to achieve a 
different result.  Alternatively, the default rules can try to achieve 
some result that is better overall for society.  Consider, for example, 
the debates about organ donation and whether the United States 
should adopt an “opt-in” system, as is currently the case, or an “opt-
out” system.192  An opt-out system, one where organs are donated 
unless the individual specifically and explicitly opts not to do so, 
recognizes that a majority of people want to donate organs after 
death, although many fail to make provisions for this.  Not only does 
the use of such a system respect those wishes, but it also results in 
more organs donated.  On the other hand, some people may have 
extremely strong objections to donation and fail to opt-out.  
Moreover, it may be difficult to document everyone who wants to 
opt-out.  Setting the default as an opt-in protects the people who do 
not want to have organs donated and allows those who wish to 
donate to do so explicitly. 
To the extent that we want to encourage or discourage certain 
actions with respect to embryos, we may set the default rules 
differently.  Rules that allow all embryos to be used after death 
unless the property interest holders leave explicit instructions will 
Social Security Act and, thus, entitled to benefits). 
 191. Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New 
Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288, 3288 (1989) (finding 
that under ten percent of patients had some form of advance directive). 
 192. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1193 (2003). 
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encourage those who feel strongly about controlling use after death 
to make appropriate provisions in wills, or other estate planning 
devices.  The end result may be more embryos available for donation 
or research.  On the other hand, it could be that the majority of the 
population does not want or expect to have children born post-
mortem, and the better default would be to destroy (or donate to 
research) all embryos after death, unless other arrangements have 
been made.  As mentioned previously, it is in this context that 
utilitarian theory proves most useful in deciding on rules. 
Where individuals who currently hold property interests are 
available and cannot reach an agreement, the embryos should be 
stored as long as one of the parties requests (and pays for) this 
privilege.  The continued storage respects the property interests and 
leaves open the possibility that the other party will change his or 
her mind.  If both parties are unreachable, indefinite storage is not 
necessary.  The property interest holders may relinquish their rights 
“without regard to any future possession by []self, or by any other 
person, but with an intention to abandon” the embryos.193  Such 
abandonment may be shown through the actions (or inaction) of the 
property interest holders over a period of time.  Where repeated 
attempts at eliciting a response from the property owners fail, the 
facility may destroy the embryos or use them in accordance with the 
property interest holders’ intent.  For example, in the absence of 
other indicators of intent, embryos given to a research institution 
should not be used for reproduction, and those provided to a 
reproductive services facility should not be used for stem cell 
research since presumably the intent in the former case was to 
donate for research and the intent in the latter was to use for 
reproduction.194
Finally, if a property interest holder dies without leaving any 
instructions or other clear evidence of intent, the embryos may be 
subject to the general rules of inheritance.  For example, in the Rios 
case, the progenitors died in a plane crash with no advance 
agreements and left two frozen embryos in storage in Australia.195  
 193. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (6th ed. 1990); see also Lynne M. Thomas, 
Comment, Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Texas Law of Abandoned Personal 
Property: Should There Be a Connection?, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 255 (1997) (arguing 
that general Texas law applies to frozen embryos, but that the law should be 
amended to exclude such entities). 
 194. Moreover, in the reproduction case the parties may have only intended 
their embryos be used for specific persons’ reproduction (either their own or a 
specifically designated recipient). 
 195. See BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 212-13 (1992) (describing the Rios case).  The 
primary question for the court was not simply disposition of the embryos, but 
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The sole heir was Mr. Rios’s son from a previous marriage.196  
Although individuals have lifetime interests in controlling what 
happens to their property after death (through wills and trusts), 
these interests are neither unlimited, nor do they survive where the 
decedent has failed to exercise the control during his or her 
lifetime.197  The heirs have existing interests in the creation of 
additional children who may be blood relations and may be entitled 
to a share of the estate.  A general rule that embryo control will 
follow inheritance rules may lead some people to make 
arrangements for disposition when they otherwise would have failed 
to do so.  Moreover, the inheritance rules are well established in all 
jurisdictions, and courts have vast experience mediating disputes in 
this context. 
D.  Application to Previous Cases 
As noted previously, there are few reported cases involving 
disposition of frozen embryos.  To a large extent, the courts are 
already applying a property framework, although they have been 
unwilling to state the arguments in exactly those terms.  Moreover, 
some aspects of the decisions would be different if the courts were 
fully to embrace the property analysis described here, rather than 
the traditional procreative liberty framework.  The end result should 
be a more accurate description of the legal bases for existing 
decisions, as well as a more easily understood set of rules for 
resolving disputes.  All of the cases below involve divorcing parties 
who created and stored embryos. 
In Davis v. Davis, a 1992 Tennessee case, the court balanced the 
procreative interests of the parties, concluded that the right not to 
reproduce was stronger than the right to reproduce, and awarded 
control to Mr. Davis who wanted to destroy the embryos.198  By 
contrast, under the model described here, the embryos should have 
been regarded as the property of both Mrs. and Mr. Davis—with 
both parties having an equal say in disposition.  The embryos were 
not an “interim category” of neither persons nor property as the 
court claimed,199 but unquestionably the progenitors’ property.  Since 
whether they should be considered heirs to the Rios’ million-dollar estate.  
(Interestingly, it was later discovered that the embryos were created with donor 
sperm.)  Id.  For additional discussion of this issue, see Hoffman & Morriss, 
supra note 60. 
 196. STEINBOCK, supra note 195, at 212. 
 197. For a discussion of postmortem interests, see Jessica Berg, Grave 
Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 34 CONN. L. 
REV. 81 (2001). 
 198. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
 199. Id. at 597. 
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there was no agreement between the parties, the embryos should 
have been stored indefinitely, as long as the party wishing to 
continue storage was willing to pay.  In this situation, Mrs. Davis 
may well have preferred to pay the storage fees in the hopes that 
she might convince Mr. Davis to agree to donate the embryos.  
Storage should continue until the death of one of the parties, at 
which point control over disposition would fall to the heirs either 
explicitly through a will or via laws of intestate succession. 
In Kass v. Kass, a 1998 case from New York, the court upheld 
the party’s contract, and the embryos were donated to research.200  
The result under this Article’s framework would be the same.  
Unlike the court in J.B. v. M.B., a 2001 case from New Jersey, I 
would not allow one party “to change his or her mind about 
disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored 
preembryos.”201 Both parties could certainly agree to modify the 
contract, but unilateral changes would not be permitted.  Moreover, 
like the Davis court, the J.B. court also gave undue weight to the 
interests of the party choosing not to become the biological parent.202  
Since the contract in the J.B. case was less clear than in the Kass 
case, stating that control of the embryos went to the IVF center 
unless the court ordered otherwise, the court could have focused on 
each party’s intention at the time the embryos and contract were 
created.  The wording of the contract implied an intention to allow 
the IVF center to dispose of the embryos.  However, the husband 
provided a witness who testified that he and his wife agreed that the 
embryos would be either used by her or donated to another couple.203  
Considering that the IVF center provided embryos for infertile 
couples, it is possible that the husband’s intention in transferring 
his interests was to allow this use, but no other, by the center.  The 
court in J.B. refused to consider this argument stating “a formal, 
unambiguous memorialization of the parties’ intentions would be 
required to confirm their joint determination.”204  If the court felt 
that the contractual agreement was not clear on this point, then the 
embryos could continue to be stored, rather than destroyed.205
Litowitz v. Litowitz, a 2002 case from Washington, is the only 
case in which a gamete donor was used, and the court recognized 
that the contract with the egg donor transferred property rights to 
 200. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 201. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001). 
 202. Id. at 716. 
 203. Id. at 710. 
 204. Id. at 714. 
 205. The court noted this possibility stating, “It was represented to us at 
oral argument . . . that J.B. does not object to their continued storage if M.B. 
wishes to pay any fees associated with that storage.”  Id. at 720. 
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the intentional mother.206  This initial step is correct under the 
property framework.  The remaining analysis by the court, however, 
was less appropriate.  In this case, the ex-wife wanted to use the 
embryos herself, while her ex-husband wanted to donate them to 
another couple.  Like Kass and J.B., the court in Litowitz focused on 
the contract, which stated that the remaining embryos were to be 
destroyed after they have been frozen for five years.207  Although the 
court’s emphasis on contractual interpretation is correct, the result 
in this case is odd, as the dissent pointed out, given that neither 
party was seeking the destruction of the embryos and that the time 
delay was caused by the litigation.208  Under the property 
framework, if there were no way to resolve the issue of intent, the 
embryos should have remained in storage for the stipulated five 
years, excluding the time taken for litigation.  During that time 
period the parties would have the opportunity to reach an 
agreement regarding disposition, or even agree to extend the storage 
beyond the five-year time limit. 
Finally, A.Z. v. B.Z., a 2000 case from Massachusetts, involved a 
contract that stipulated that control over the embryos would go to 
the wife for implantation in case of separation.209  The court gave 
limited weight to the consent form, noting in particular that the 
current circumstances involved a divorce, not a separation.210  
Moreover, it stated that even if the contract were applicable, it 
“would not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to 
become a parent against his or her will.”211  By contrast, the 
framework described here recognizes that the parties have already 
procreated and that there is no longer any preference given to a 
 206. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 267 (Wash. 2002) (“Petitioner Becky 
M. Litowitz correctly asserts that the egg donor contract gives her and 
Respondent equal rights to the eggs even though she is not a progenitor.”). 
 207. Id. at 271. 
 208. Id. at 272.  (Sanders, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the contractual time 
period was tolled by the timely commencement of this litigation as a matter of 
law”).  Dissenting Judge Sanders states that rather than apply that contractual 
provision, the court should have considered the parties’ intent by objectively 
evaluating “(1) the language of the agreement; (2) the agreement as a whole; (3) 
the context in which the agreement was entered; (4) the parties’ conduct 
following entry into the agreement; and (5) the reasonableness of the 
interpretations advocated by the parties.”  Id. at 273 (Sanders, J., dissenting).  
The dissent goes on to state that the trial court’s determination that the 
embryos should be given to the ex-husband to donate should be given deference.  
Id. at 274 (Sanders, J. dissenting). 
 209. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Mass. 2000). 
 210. Id. at 1057. 
 211. Id.  The court explicitly refused to say whether it would enforce an 
unambiguous agreement to donate or destroy the embryos.  Id. at 1058 n.22. 
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right not to reproduce.  Thus, the appropriate course of action, if the 
agreement was applicable to the fact situation (separation versus 
divorce), would be to grant control over the embryos to the wife and 
allow her to implant them.  One might argue that an understanding 
that the wife would get the embryos in case of separation should 
include divorce.  In other words, if the husband contemplated his 
wife implanting the embryos after separation, it is hard to 
understand why he would object to implantation in case of divorce.  
Nonetheless, if the court determined that there was no valid 
agreement, the appropriate course of action would be continued 
storage as long as one of the parties is willing to pay. 
For each of these cases, and in future cases, agreements 
between the progenitors should be given significant weight.  Courts 
may require fairly explicit evidence of intent and adherence to 
formal contractual requirements.212  But in the absence of 
agreement, the default should generally be continued storage, not 
destruction or implantation.  Ideally, the initial contracts should 
include storage time limits, after which a final disposition 
(destruction or donation) would occur regardless of the eventual 
circumstances of the parties.  Creating a default where embryos can 
be stored indefinitely, as I have done above, should create pressure 
to avoid such scenarios by placing strict time limits on storage.  
Clinics involved in the creation of embryos should encourage such 
clauses in their forms and draw parties’ attention to the provision 
when executing the document.213  Moreover, the forms should be 
regarded as contractual agreements, not merely consents to 
treatment, and should have appropriate safeguards around their 
execution.  This may include requiring the contracting parties to 
obtain legal representation, or at least encouraging legal review of 
the document before signing. 
IV.     AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
This final Part is designed to foreshadow work that will be fully 
 212. See, e.g., In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473, 477-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) 
(relying on a number of factors in granting paternity rights to a known sperm 
donor).  The court discounted the woman’s claim that the parties had orally 
agreed that she would have all rights to the resulting children and stated that 
the parties’ intent does not control parentage in this case.  Id. 
 213. Florida requires this by statute.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1994) 
(“A commissioning couple and the treating physician shall enter into a written 
agreement that provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, 
sperm, and preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any 
other unforeseen circumstance.”).  Section 742.17(2) states that “[a]bsent a 
written agreement, decisionmaking authority regarding the disposition of 
preembryos shall reside jointly with the commissioning couple.” 
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developed in the companion article.  This Article focuses primarily 
on the application of property theories and thus property law.  But 
having begun the Article with the assertion that property and 
persons are not mutually exclusive designations, I want to say a bit 
about where I am going with the complete framework. 
First, one might wonder why even start with the legal 
frameworks of “persons” and “property” rather then develop an 
entirely new approach that relies on neither.  The simple answer is 
pragmatic—the current system of law has both a framework of 
property rights214 and a framework of the rights of persons.215  The 
state courts216 and legislatures217 addressing these issues need to be 
able to draw on a framework of analysis that can be easily applied 
across an array of different types of legal disputes.  Although it may 
seem tempting to talk about these entities as if they are neither 
persons nor property but a new special category, such terminology 
does little by itself to advance the legal analysis or provide a helpful 
framework for evaluation.218  In fact, the courts that seem to choose 
 214. This Article uses a rights-based approach, since that is what courts and 
legislatures are most comfortable adopting and because they will be deciding 
these issues.  This is not to say that other theories such as communitarianism 
or feminist ethics may not have significant implications for evaluating the 
status of embryos or resolving disputes involving embryos, but they are not the 
focus of this Article.  See, e.g., Janet Farrell Smith, Parenting and Property, in 
MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 199 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983) (using a 
feminist ethics approach to criticize the framing of procreation issues in terms 
of property rights, since they are often thought to come out of a patriarchal 
system). 
 215. There is a long history of both property law and personhood law.  See, 
e.g., S.J. STOLJAR, GROUPS AND ENTITIES: AN INQUIRY INTO CORPORATE THEORY 
(1973) (discussing, among other topics, the Roman law of persons). 
 216. Even if statutes are drafted, resolution of the debates in question lends 
itself to a case-by-case review.  State courts are best suited for this task.  See 
ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION 
MAKING 82-84 (1996) (discussing the role of state courts and legislatures in 
resolving disputes about embryos). 
 217. See discussion supra Part III. 
 218. I acknowledge the possibility that new legal categories may be 
necessary in the future with the development or discovery of new life forms.  
See, e.g., Richard Lucas, Why Bother? Ethical Computers – That’s Why!, in 
SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE SECOND AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON 
COMPUTER ETHICS 33 (John Weckert ed., 2000).  Lucas argues that computers 
(and other artificial intelligence) may be held to moral standards as persons 
because they possess the following characteristics: reason, the capacity for 
choice, self-awareness, nurturance, co-operation, respect for all life-forms, and 
moral reciprocity.  “Computer-ethics” must contain, at least, computer (not 
human) versions of anonymity, duty, equality, intentionality, judgment, and 
responsibility.  Id. at 38; see also Linda MacDonald Glenn, A Legal Perspective 
on Humanity, Personhood, and Species Boundaries, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 
BERG-ROLLUP 3/23/2005  3:24 PM 
2005]  PROPERTY INTERESTS AND EMBRYOS 211 
 
this route merely note the embryo’s “special” status, but then revert 
to precepts of property law to resolve the dispute.219  So, although it 
is certainly possible that a new legal category could be developed, 
there are significant downsides that may outweigh the conceptual 
benefit of such an approach.  For example, courts dealing with 
entities covered by a new category must have some guidelines for 
how to resolve disputes.  There are no legal guidelines for 
addressing relations involving entities that are neither persons nor 
property.  How would disputes be handled?  Could persons have 
rights against the new category?220  Could the new entity hold rights 
against persons? Whose rights would take precedence in a dispute 
between persons and the new entity?  We may certainly try to 
answer these questions, but the educational costs of assuring that 
the courts handling the disputes are knowledgeable are extensive.221
Even assuming that using the existing frameworks is 
appropriate, it may seem radical to propose a combined property 
and personhood framework, particularly given our country’s history 
with slavery.222  However, the theories may not provide an initial 
basis for recognizing the property interests in the context of slavery.  
Blacks and women may not be regarded as products of the body 
(except with respect to their parents), nor are they likely to be 
considered “investments” appropriately recognized under a labor 
theory.  The ownership of slaves is not necessary for the 
development of self-identity under a personality theory in most 
cases.  The reasons for outlawing slavery under utilitarian theory 
are more difficult.  It may be that slavery always results in greater 
harm than good and always results in a less efficient system.223
2003, at 27, 27 (considering human-nonhuman chimeras); Michael D. Rivard, 
Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of 
Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
1425 (1992) (considering transgenic humanoid species). 
 219. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 220. HOHFELD, supra note 44, at 75-76 (stating that all rights of persons are 
against other persons and that there is no such thing as a right against a 
thing). 
 221. If, however, the use of the current legal frameworks would be subject to 
extensive limitations or exceptions then the frameworks themselves may 
become meaningless.  The costs of educating decision makers about the 
restrictions may be so great as to weigh in favor of simply developing a new 
legal category and providing education regarding that new category, and thus 
avoiding the unwanted baggage that may attach to the use of the categorization 
in the first place. 
 222. Cf. Boudewijn Bouckaert, What Is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
775, 801 (1990) (stating that the control issues in slavery are better thought of 
as personal rights rather than ownership rights). 
 223. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 160 (discussing utilitarian reasons for 
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But even assuming that one could successfully apply one of the 
theories of property (for example, that one could make a claim for 
labor investment or personality), there may be a problem in internal 
consistency.  As pointed out previously, both the labor theory and 
personality theory rest on the assumption that recognizing property 
rights is necessary for the functioning of free individuals.  To the 
extent that the recognition of the property rights of one individual 
limits the ability of another individual to be free, it would violate the 
initial precept upon which either theory is based.  Moreover, even if 
this did not prove to be a barrier (for example, it is less clear why a 
utilitarian theory would always restrict slavery), the personhood 
interests of blacks and women would necessarily limit any claimed 
property interests.224  Thus, the framework I describe here does not 
provide a basis for limiting the rights of blacks, women, or other 
disadvantaged groups of persons. 
The framework does, however, have significant implications for 
children.  If we accept that there are property interests in embryos, 
then those interests likewise exist in later developed fetuses and 
also in children.  Furthermore, the categorization of parental rights 
as property interests appears to be descriptively accurate.225  Parents 
restricting slavery). 
 224. Of course part of the issue at the time of slavery and limitation of 
women’s rights was the assertion that women and blacks were not full persons 
and, thus, not entitled to the protections of full persons.  I address this issue in 
more detail in the companion piece, which considers the legal framework of 
personhood. 
  There is an extremely interesting case about a free-born black woman 
who was captured, enslaved, and bore a daughter.  She escaped and then sued 
for “possession” of her daughter.  The court gave priority to the mother’s 
interests in the girl over the slave owner.  Reporting on the case, Professor 
Anita Allen describes how the mother “was able to persuade the court that she 
was the rightful owner of her daughter.”  Allen, supra note 45, at 144.  Allen 
uses the case to point out the concerns with surrogacy arrangements and notes 
that it serves as an example of how “the desire to parent and to enjoy the 
companionship of one’s children can be very strong.”  Id. at 145.  It is exactly 
these strong feelings that may form the basis for acknowledging property 
interests in one’s children.  Property in this sense is not a bad thing as it was in 
slavery, but an actualization of the parents’ legitimate interests in their 
children.  Nonetheless, how we choose to recognize those interests—in giving 
deference to parental rights of decision making—may depend on the weight we 
give to children’s personhood interests. 
 225. For a historical analysis of the progression of children as property to 
children as individuals, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the 
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
995 (1992) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?].  Woodhouse 
provides a historical analysis to bolster her argument that the continued 
categorization of children as property is problematic.  According to Woodhouse, 
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retain significant interests in controlling the lives of their children, 
including deciding how, where, and under what circumstances they 
are raised.226  The protections the legal system currently affords 
parents under the heading of “parental rights” are more extensive 
than can be justified merely by the presumption that parents act in 
the best interests of their children and thus should be the primary 
decision makers.227  Although the concept of “objective best interests” 
comes into play when the child’s life or health is at risk, the vast 
majority of decisions that parents make on behalf of their children 
are never measured against this standard.  This is not to say that 
parents do not think in terms of the child’s interests, but that those 
interests are inextricably entwined with the parents’ own interests.  
In part, this is what makes it so difficult to apply an objective best-
interest standard and what has led courts to define even “best 
medical interests” rather broadly.228  A focus solely on the child’s 
historically children were the property of their fathers, who were entitled to 
treat them as “assets of estates in which fathers had a vested right. . . . Their 
services, earnings, and the like became the property of their paternal masters 
in exchange for life and maintenance.”  Id. at 1037 (alteration in original) 
(quoting MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (1985)).   
The parental rights of control and custody, constitutionalized by the 
Supreme Court in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska and Stanley v. Illinois, 
confer a strange liberty that consists in the right to control not one’s 
self or one’s goods, but another human being.  Echoing the 
rationalizations used to support male dominance over women and 
masters’ control of slaves, parents’ rights are justified by assuming 
unity of interest between powerful and weak.   
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s Rights”: The 
Child’s Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 325-26 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted).  I do not necessarily disagree with Woodhouse that parental 
rights of control should be limited.  In fact, I think the categorization of 
parental interests as property interests may lead to additional limitations as we 
give more weight to children’s personhood interests. 
 226. The Supreme Court cases frame this interest as a fundamental liberty 
interest in freedom from state interference with decision about raising children.  
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923)) (rights to establish a home, raise children, control education); 
Santosky v.  Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944) (right to direct upbringing); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the 
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (control education).  Despite 
the fact that the Court frames the issue as one of liberty, I argue that the rights 
in question are really based on parents’ property interests. 
 227. See Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When 
Parents Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference 
Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 228. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) 
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best interest would undermine the current system of parental rights 
and should, in many more cases than happens currently, result in 
significant limitations on parental decision making and some 
children being taken from their parents and raised by others.229  In 
other words, there must be something else driving the system of 
decision making for children besides a simple concern that the 
child’s best interest takes priority. 
Decisions that a child can be home schooled or raised in a 
particular religious tradition are examples focused on the parents’ 
interests in raising a child as they see fit.  These parental interests 
are best described as property interests, not liberty interests.230  The 
property interests stem from both the parental investment in the 
child (labor) and the effect of the child on the development of the 
parents’ own identities (personality).  Thus, legal recognition of so-
called “parental rights” is really recognition of parents’ property 
interests in children,231 even though the use of such terms may make 
(allowing a kidney transplant between siblings based on the notion that the 
best interests of the incompetent ward included saving his brother’s life). 
 229. Others have pointed out that in a few cases the best-interest analysis 
has been applied too broadly to limit parental rights.  Rothbard, for example, 
cites two cases where children were removed from parental control based on 
concern about their religious and moral well-being.  See ROTHBARD, supra note 
27, at 105-06.  Contrast this with the argument of Smith, supra note 214, that 
we should discard the property model in favor of one focused on the child’s 
interests.  Although courts have begun to move away from a strong notion of 
children as absolute property of the parents, the limitations placed on the 
exercise of parental rights stem not from a failure to recognize parental 
property interests, but from the recent recognition of the child’s personhood 
interests and rights.  See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a 
“Parent”?  The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 353, 363 (1991). 
 230. See, e.g., Merry Jean Chan, The Authorial Parent: An Intellectual 
Property Model of Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186 (2003) (arguing that 
the liberty model is inadequate and proposing instead an intellectual property 
model, such as the model used for copyright law). 
 231. See Smith, supra note 214, at 199 (stating that “an implicit model of 
property relations underlies certain views about parenting”); Woodhouse, Who 
Owns the Child?, supra note 225, at 997 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence rests on “conservative attachment . . . to a parent’s private 
property rights in his children and their labor”).  I will not address Woodhouse’s 
proposal that the property approach is flawed in the case of children.  See also 
RADIN, supra note 70, 141 (suggesting that in the traditional surrogacy 
situation there is a “covert understanding that the baby is already someone 
else’s property—the father’s”).  Neither Smith nor Woodhouse argue in favor of 
recognition of parents’ property interests in their children, just the contrary.  I 
argue that property theory explains parental interests and is a more accurate 
legal basis upon which to ground parental rights, although the exercise of 
parental property rights may be limited. 
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many people (parents especially!) uncomfortable.  My purpose in 
stressing the link between property interests and parental rights is 
not to argue in favor of parental rights of complete control,232 rather 
to show that debates about childrens’ rights (personhood interests) 
and parents’ rights (property interests) may be best framed in just 
those terms.233  There may be reasons to want to avoid 
characterizing parental interests as property interests—including 
the concern that it might lead parents to act in inappropriate ways 
towards children or that it might minimize the complexity of the 
parent-child relationship.234  But framing the interests in this way is 
more accurate given the underlying legal interests.  Moreover, we 
might be more inclined to limit parental rights in certain situations 
when they are not cloaked as decisions made in the best interests of 
children, but rather acknowledged as resting on parental property 
interests. 
Categorizing parental interests in children as property interests 
does not mean that parents own their children in the same way they 
own their house—or that parental interests dominate in all or even 
most situations.  In many situations, the child’s personhood 
interests will limit or even trump parental property interests, but 
the result does not negate the existence of those property interests.  
It is not an all-or-nothing event—property interests do not simply 
pop out of existence and personhood interests appear in full force.235  
 232.  Guzman writes: 
To say that a parent has certain property-type rights in a child 
neither states nor endorses that the parent owns the child or that the 
child is the property of the parents.  The issue is how far the rights go 
and under what circumstances, which depends on the context and 
extent of control sought.   
Guzman, supra note 13, at 213; see also Stephen G. Gilles, Selective Funding of 
Education: An Epsteinian Analysis, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 745, 763 (2000) 
(using a Rawlsian social contract theory to argue for limited parental property 
rights in children). 
 233. Rothbard states that the parental interest is not “ownership of the child 
in absolute fee simple,” but a parental ownership limited both in time and in 
type (he calls it a “‘trustee’ or guardianship kind”).  ROTHBARD, supra note 27, at 
99; see also Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 583 (N.J. 2000) (stating that a 
father has no absolute property right in custody but is better viewed as a 
trustee). 
 234. In other words, even though the description of the legal rights is 
accurate, there may be other reasons to label (and thus understand) the parent-
child relationship differently.  See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 70, at 143 (“We might 
make better progress . . . toward a better view of contextual personhood—by 
breaking down the notion that children are fathers’ (or parents’) genetic 
property.”). 
 235. In fact, some of the theories provide a basis for recognizing increasing, 
rather than decreasing, parental interests as time progresses (for example, 
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Rather, limitations of the practical application of the interests arise 
from inherent limitations in the theories themselves as described 
above or are based on the developing personhood interests of the 
entity in question.  In essence, the two reduce to the same thing.  As 
we recognize personhood interests, we necessarily limit others’ 
property interests.  Since personhood interests increase as the entity 
develops, parental rights of control decrease over time.236
When children reach the age of majority, parents’ rights are no 
longer given any force.  At this point, the child’s personhood 
interests outweigh all manifestations of the parental property 
interests.  Working backwards from that point we might ask a series 
of questions.  First, when do embryos/fetuses/children develop 
personhood interests?  Second, at what point should legal 
personhood protections be applied to these entities?  Third, how 
should the protections function and what is the interplay between 
the personhood interests and property interests?  These important 
issues are addressed in the companion piece to this Article. 
V.     CONCLUSION 
Are embryos and fetuses properly categorized as persons, 
property, neither, or both?  This Article answers the question by 
proposing and applying a novel approach combining both property 
and personhood law.  It focuses on whether there are property 
interests in the embryo, and a companion piece explores how 
developing personhood interests limit the property interests.  This 
Article concludes that there are normative grounds for recognizing 
property interests in embryos and fetuses, and these property 
interests are a more appropriate basis for analysis of rights in this 
context than procreative liberty interests.  Moreover, the shift from 
procreative liberty to property theory has significant implications for 
the factors courts should consider: who can assert a property 
interest and whether and how those interests can be transferred.  
The end result should be a more descriptively accurate 
representation of the issues involved in embryo disputes, as well as 
a more appropriate normative framework under which to resolve 
labor theory).  
 236. Locke states:  
[P]arents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over [children] when they 
come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but a temporary 
one.  The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they 
are wrapped up in and supported by in the weakness of their infancy;  
age and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop 
quite off and leave a man at his own free disposal. 
 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 31-32 (Thomas P. Peardon 
ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1952) (1690). 
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disagreements. 
Since this Article focuses on embryos and fetuses, it refrains 
from assertions about what other kinds of entities might operate in 
the combined framework of both property and person law.  It may be 
that embryos, and by extension other offspring of one’s body, are 
unique and no other entity fits such a paradigm.  At least one 
author, however, has suggested that we should consider such a 
framework for animals—recognizing property rights in the animal, 
but also granting them limited personhood rights.237  Animals would 
then have their own legally cognizable interests that could be 
asserted against third parties.238  New forms of artificial intelligence 
might prove to be another example of an entity that would fit under 
a combined person/property framework.239
In addition, the Article does not attempt to resolve debates 
between different theories of property, or even to set forth all of the 
possible permutations of the different theories.  To the extent that 
one supports a certain approach over another, one’s preferred theory 
may have slightly different implications for the resolution of actual 
disputes over embryos.  Nonetheless, property law overall provides 
the appropriate framework under which to analyze embryos.  As the 
embryo develops, however, it will develop personhood interests and 
these will function to limit the property interests.  The implications 
of these limitations for a multitude of reproductive rights debates, 
including abortion and surrogacy, are explored in the companion 
article.  But acknowledging the role of personhood interests in the 
evaluation does not take away from the importance of recognizing 
property interests.  Perhaps fetuses and children are, from a legal 
perspective, most accurately described as “owned persons.” 
 237. David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473 
(2000); Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues 
Relating to Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 196-97 (2003) 
(discussing David Favre’s recommendation that retains the concept of property 
ownership in animals for some purposes while providing animals the status of 
“juristic persons,” based on the premise that animals possess self-ownership in 
some circumstances). 
 238. Huss, supra note 237, at 196-97. 
 239. Consider the science-fiction films Blade Runner or A.I.  
